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Kittredge: Corporations - Mergers - Delaware Redefines Entire Fairness Test

CORPORATIONS-MERGERS-DELAWARE REDEFINES "ENTIRE
FAIRNESS" TEST FOR CASH-OUT MERGERS AND SUGGESTS
MORE LIBERAL APPRAISAL REMEDY

Wenberger v. UOP, Inc. (Del. 1983)
1
As a result of having sold one of its wholly-owned subsidiaries, Signal
Companies, Inc. ("Signal") was able to acquire a 50.5% interest in UOP, Inc.
("UOP"). 2 Three years later, having been unsuccessful in finding other suitable investments for its excess cash, Signal sought to buy the balance of
3
UOP's outstanding shares.
In February of 1978, Signal's management requested that a feasibility
study be conducted concerning the possible acquisition of UOP's remaining
outstanding stock. 4 A report was prepared by two officers of Signal who
5
served on the boards of directors of both Signal and UOP. The report,
based on UOP data, concluded that the remaining shares of UOP would be
a good investment for Signal at any price up to twenty-four dollars per
6
share.

1. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 426 A.2d 1333, 1335 (Del. Ch. 1981). Due to the
sale, Signal received $420 million in cash. Id.
2. Id. at 1336. Signal is a corporation engaged in diverse activities, operating
through its subsidiaries. Id. at 1335. Its stock is listed on the New York, Philadelphia
and Pacific Stock Exchanges. Id. UOP, formerly known as Universal Oil Products
Company, is a diversified industrial company involved in petroleum and petrochemical services and products, construction, fabricated metal products, transportation
equipment, chemicals, plastics, and other products and services including land development, lumber products and waste treatment. Id. Its stock was listed on the New
York Exchange. Id.
Signal's acquisition of its 50.5% interest in UOP was the result of arm's-length
negotiations which culminated in a plan by which Signal would purchase 1.5 million
of UOP treasury shares at $21 per share, contingent upon Signal's successful tender
offer for 4.3 million of publicly held shares of UOP at the same price. Id. at 1336.
Even though the tender offer of $21 per share for UOP stock was over-subscribed,
Signal limited its purchase to 4.8 million tendered UOP shares, which, when added
to the 1.5 million shares it purchased from UOP, gave Signal a 50.5% interest in the
outstanding shares of UOP. Id.
Immediately following its 50.5% acquisition, Signal nominated six men to
UOP's thirteen-man board of directors. Of these thirteen directors, five were either
Signal directors or employees, and the sixth was an investment banker who represented Signal in the negotiations for the acquisition of its majority interest in UOP.
Id. When the chief executive officer of UOP retired during that year, Signal replaced him in his executive and director's capacity with a senior vice president of one
of Signal's wholly-owned subsidiaries. Id.
3. Id. at 1337.
4. Id. Two of the Signal executives who requested the feasibility study were also
UOP directors. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 705 (Del. 1983).
5. 426 A.2d at 1337.
6. Id. Just prior to the Signal executive committee meeting where negotiations
for the cash merger with UOP were authorized, UOP's president, who served on the
board of directors of both Signal and UOP, indicated in a private meeting with Sig-
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After four days of limited "negotiations,"' 7 Signal's board proposed a
cash merger offering UOP shareholders twenty-one dollars per share and
requiring approval by a majority of UOP's outstanding minority shares, as
well as two-thirds of all outstanding UOP shares. 8 That same day, with
copies of the proposed merger agreement, UOP financial statements, and a
"fairness opinion" prepared by Lehman Brothers before them, 9 UOP's nonnal executive committee members, that a price of $20 to $21 per share was "generous" and should be considered by UOP shareholders. Id. He also expressed his
concern that the merger provide for the continued employment of and benefits for
UOP employees. Id. On February 28, 1978, the Signal executive committee authorized negotiations for a cash acquisition of the minority ownership in UOP. Id.
7. During the four "business days" between February 28 and March 6, 1973, the
merger plan came to fruition. During this time two press releases were issued stating
that Signal and UOP were "negotiating." 457 A.2d at 706. In fact, in only one
conversation was price discussed. In that conversation UOP's president suggested
that the price per UOP share should be at the upper end of the $20 to $21 range. Id.
No higher price than that originally proposed was ever sought. Id.
Also during this period, UOP retained Lehman Brothers Kuhn Loeb, Inc. to
render a fairness opinion. Id. Because the time available was short (by the time
Lehman Brothers was retained, there remained three business days and a weekend in
which to investigate and submit an opinion), it was felt that Lehman Brothers was an
appropriate firm to render the opinion since it had served as UOP's investment
banker and since one of its partners was on the board of directors of UOP and had
acted as its financial advisor for several years. Id.
8. 457 A.2d at 707. The merger was to be effectuated between UOP and Sigco,
Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary of Signal. 426 A.2d at 1335. As a result of the
merger, UOP, the surviving entity, would become a wholly-owned subsidiary of Signal and its former minority shareholders would receive $21 per share for their former
interest in UOP. Id.
9. 426 A.2d at 1339. After an independent review of the record, both the Delaware Chancery Court and the Delaware Supreme Court found that the feasibility
study had not been discussed at the UOP board meeting. Id. Neither the document
itself nor its contents were disclosed to the UOP board members. Id.
The Lehman Brothers "fairness opinion" was characterized by the court as
"rather cursory" and "hurried" where speed was the hallmark. 457 A.2d at 712.
Additionally, the opinion letter was drafted with a blank for the fair price to be filled
in at a later date. This blank was filled in either just prior to, or during the March 6,
1978 meeting. 426 A.2d at 1339.
In their deliberations concerning the terms of the proposed merger, the chancellor stated that "the primary factor considered by those concerned was the comparison of Signal's 1978 proposal with the situation prevailing at the time of the 1975
tender offer." Id. at 1354. Just before the 1975 Signal tender offer, UOP shares were
trading just below $14. Id. Signal's offer of $21 per share at that time was oversubscribed. Id. Following Signal's acquisition, UOP suffered an unanticipated loss of
$35 million. Id. at 1336. By early 1978, UOP data indicated that it was in essentially
the same financial condition it had been in 1974 and was showing comparable earnings. Id. at 1354. In fact, at the time of the merger proposal, UOP stock was trading
at $14.50 per share, a similar price. Id. As the chancellor stated,
[I]t is fairly clear that these factors, taken in conjunction with the
financial information available and made available to the independent
members of UOP's board as well as the fairness opinion supplied by Lehman Brothers, caused the general feeling to be that if $21 per share was an
unnecessarily high price to have paid in 1975, it was a fair price to pay for
the minority shares in 1978 under comparable circumstances.
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Signal directors resolved to accept the terms of the merger. 10 Two months
later, 76.2% of the outstanding UOP shares, including the requisite majority
of minority shares, voted in favor of the merger." By the terms of the agreement, the merger became effective on that date, and each share of the minority's outstanding stock was converted to a right to receive twenty-one dollars
2
in cash.'
Thereafter, William Weinberger, a former UOP shareholder, instituted
a class action against Signal, UOP and Lehman Brothers.' 3 The class action
plaintiffs sought to set aside the merger on the grounds that Signal, as a
majority shareholder of UOP, had breached its fiduciary duty to UOP's minority shareholders by using the corporate machinery to cash them out at an
4
unfair price without a proper business purpose.'
After a full trial, the chancery court entered judgment for the defend10. 426 A.2d at 1340. Two directors of UOP, who also sat on the Signal board,
left the UOP board meeting in order to promote uninhibited discussion of the merger
by UOP's non-Signal directors. Id. Likewise, the other four directors of UOP, who
were also directors of Signal, were not involved in UOP's discussion concerning the
terms of the merger. Id. On advice of counsel, five of the six UOP directors who
were also Signal directors abstained from voting. Id. All five indicated that if they
had voted, they would have voted in favor of the merger. Id. However, two UOP
directors who were nominated by Signal, one of whom was also a Signal director,
voted in favor of the merger. Id.
11. Id. Even though both boards had acted swiftly on the proposed merger, the
plan was not submitted to the UOP shareholders until their annual meeting on May
26, 1978. 457 A.2d at 707-08. As of the record date for the annual meeting, there
were 11,488,302 shares of UOP common stock outstanding. 426 A.2d at 1340. Signal
did not own 5,688,302 of those shares. Id. Fifty-six percent of the minority shares
were voted, of which 2,953,812 (92% of the voting minority shares) voted in favor of
the merger, while 254,840 (8% of the voting minority shares) voted against it. Id.
When Signal voted all of its shares in favor of the merger, the result was that 76.2% of
the outstanding shares voted in favor of the merger, with only 2.2% opposing. Id.
12. 426 A.2d at 1340. The merger occurred pursuant to the terms of the Delaware "long-form" merger statute. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (1974 & Supp. 1982).
For a discussion of the long-form merger statute, see note 19 infra.
13. 426 A.2d at 1334-35. The plaintiffs sued on behalf of all UOP shareholders
as of the merger date who had not exchanged their shares for the merger price. Id. at
1335. They subsequently filed a post-trial motion to enlarge the class to include all
former shareholders of UOP other than Signal. Id.
The plaintiffs' theory of liability as to Lehman was based on conspiracy and
conflict of interest. Id. at 1341. The plaintiffs contended that Lehman had engaged
in a conspiracy with Signal and the Signal-controlled management of UOP to make
it appear as if Lehman had given a "considered and impartial opinion" on the fairness of the merger price. Id. Shortly before their final oral argument, the plaintiffs
dropped Lehman from the case. 457 A.2d at 703 n.3. The Delaware Supreme Court,
therefore, did not consider the theory of liability against Lehman. However, the activities of Lehman, as those activities impacted on the liability of the other defendants, did remain at issue. See id. at 707.
14. 426 A.2d at 1340-41. The plaintiffs sought to set aside the merger, or in the
alternative, equitable recission in the form of either money damages or a stock interest in Signal. Id. at 1335. The plaintiffs also contended that the UOP board should
have required an appraisal of the UOP shares prior to its agreement on the merger
terms, and should have considered the value of certain UOP assets in determining
the fairness of the merger price. Id. at 1341. In addition, the plaintiffs alleged that

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1983

3

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 5 [1983], Art. 7

1052

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28: p. 1049

After a full trial, the chancery court entered judgment for the defendants.15 On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court initially affirmed.1 6 After
the press releases and proxy materials issued by both UOP and Signal were misleading. Id.
15. Id. at 1363. The chancellor found that (1) Signal's purpose in proposing the
merger was not legally improper; (2) there was insufficient evidence that Signal or
UOP had misrepresented any material facts; (3) there was insufficient evidence to
support a finding that the UOP board had breached its fiduciary duty; and (4) there
was an evidentiary basis from which it could be concluded that the merger price was
fair. Id. at 1362-63.
The chancellor's final conclusion was based on expert opinions as to the fairness
of the merger price proferred by witnesses of both plaintiffs and defendants. The
plaintiffs' expert used both a comparative analysis of premiums paid over market
price in similar mergers and a discounted cash-flow analysis to arrive at his conclusion that the value of the minority shares was not less than $26 per share at the time
the merger was approved. 426 A.2d at 1356.
This comparative analysis involved a comparison between the merger price and
the premium which was paid above the market price in other mergers or tender offermerger combinations which had resulted in 100% ownership within a similar time
period. Id. In determining market price under this method, the plaintiffs' expert
attempted to factor out any distortion in price which might have resulted from leaks
to the public of an impending merger. By deducting this true market price from the
actual price paid, the plaintiffs' expert could determine the premium. Id. The median premium price paid in comparable transactions using this method was determined to be 74%. Id. at 1357. The plaintiffs' expert applied the 74% permium rate
to the price at which UOP stock was trading just before the merger proposal was
announced and found that the fair price for UOP minority shares was between
$25.65 and $27.30. Id. at 1357.
The discounted cash-flow method of valuation was also employed by the plaintiffs' expert. This type of analysis is designed to reduce to present value a projected
cash-flow. Using 1977 UOP cash-flow figures, as well as a UOP five-year plan, the
plaintiffs calculated the net free cash from operations and capitalized this figure by
means of a discount factor to determine its present value. Id. at 1357. Once the
present value of net free cash was determined, excess liquidity and extraordinary
items were added. Id. at 1357-58. This composite figure was then divided by the
number of outstanding shares to arrive at a fair value between $25.21 and $28.09 per
share. Id.
The defendants' experts, on the other hand, determined that the $21 price was
fair by utilizing the standard "Delaware block approach" to valuation in appraisal
proceedings and computing an appropriate premium. For a discussion of the Delaware block approach, see notes 38-40 and accompanying text infa.
16. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., No. 58, 1981 slip op. (Del. Feb. 9, 1982), withdrawn, 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). In the withdrawn opinion, the court found no basis
for reversing the chancellor's findings as to the fairness of the price paid. Slip op. at
3. The court found the only significant issue on appeal to be the absence of a fresh
appraisal of certain UOP assets. Id. However, the court concluded that since this
information was disclosed in the proxy materials, and there was no intention to liquidate, a fresh appraisal was not required as a matter of law. Id. at 3-4. The court
pointed out that the price offered was almost 50% over the market price, higher than
both the average trading price of the UOP shares over the past 4.5 years and the peak
market price in the year of the merger. Id. at 4. In finding the cash-out price fair, the
court also considered the vote of the majority of the minority shares approving the
merger. Id. at 4. It stated that the chancellor's view that the minority shareholders'
vote approving the merger was " 'simply another element that must be considered as
part of the overall picture in evaluating the terms of the merger for entire fairness to
the minority' [was] correct at a minimum." Id. at 4-5. The court found it "unneces-
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a rehearing en bane, the supreme court 17 reversed and remanded the case for
a determination of the fair value of the minority's shares, holding that the
standard to be applied to a cash-out merger is one of entire fairness which
requires proof of fair dealing and fair price and, absent evidence of fraud or
similar misconduct, will be evaluated in an appraisal proceeding, using valuation techniques generally accepted in the financial community and the
courts. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
A statutory merger is one method by which a minority shareholder's
interest in a corporation effectively may be eliminated.1 8 To consummate a
merger designed to eliminate the interests of minority shareholders, a corporation may employ procedures set forth in a state's merger statute which
often provide, interah'a, for cash or other securities as a form of consideration
for the minority shareholders' interest. 9 By merging a corporation into its
sary to consider in this case arguments by the defendants that greater legal effect
[was] warranted." Id.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Duffy stated that Lehman had a duty to exercise
reasonable care in rendering its opinion that the merger was fair and equitable to the
UOP minority. Id. at 7-8 (Duffy, J., dissenting). Justice Duffy thought that a trial
was required on the issue of the reasonableness of Lehman's care given the haste with
which the fairness opinion was prepared, the opinion's disregard of an internal memorandum prepared for Signal shortly after its 1975 tender offer which had concluded
that UOP stock was worth $21 to Signal just after UOP's $35 million loss, and its
failure to explain why the same price offered in 1975 was fair in 1978 after UOP's
performance significantly improved in 1976 and 1977. Id.
Justice Duffy also stated that the lower court's conclusion that the price paid to
the UOP minority was fair should have been reversed due to the chancellor's failure
to consider "the benefit flowing to Signal 'as a result of becoming the 100 percent
owner' of UOP." Id. at 9 (Duffy, J., dissenting). In Justice Duffy's view, "fairness"
required that Signal pay for what it had received, "the equitable ownership of assets
which had belonged to others." Slip op. at 10 (Duffy, J., dissenting). justice Duffy
felt that "as far as the public stockholders were concerned, the mechanics were
merger in form but liquidation in fact." Id. He noted that the chancellor had given
little weight to the net cash value of UOP, as determined by the plaintiffs' expert,
because Signal had no plan to liquidate UOP. Id. As read by Justice Duffy, this
meant that "the [majority] held that fairness to the minority was determined, not by
an objective standard but by what Signal had not planned at the time of trial." Id. at
10, n.4 (Duffy, J., dissenting).
17. Chief Justice Herrmann and Justices McNeilly, Quillen, Horsey and Moore
constituted the court en bane. Justice Moore wrote the opinion of the court.
18. For an analysis of other methods of elimination of minority shareholder interests, see F. O'NEAL, "SQUEEZE-OUTS" OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS (1975); Borden, Going Private-Old Tort, New Tort or No Tort?, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 987 (1974).
19. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 251, 253 (1974 & Supp. 1982). The
statutory framework for mergers in Delaware is set out in the Delaware General Corporation Law. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 251-58 (1975 & Supp. 1982). Section
251 relates to "long-form" mergers, where neither constituent corporation has more
than a 90% interest in the other, while § 253 relates to mergers where one of the
constituent corporations owns at least 90% of the outstanding shares of each class of
stock of the other. Id.
In a long-form merger, the boards of directors of each corporation are required
to adopt a merger agreement. Such agreement may provide for the exchange of
shares in the constituent corporation for shares or securities in the surviving corporation or for "cash, property, rights or securities of any other corporation," and gener-
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majority shareholder, or into a subsidiary of its majority shareholder, and
exchanging the minority shares for cash or other terminable interests in the
surviving corporation, upon the effective date of the merger, the minority
shareholders no longer own an interest in either the constituent or the surviv20
ing corporation.
Use of the statutory framework for the consummation of a merger to
eliminate minority shareholder interests was approved by the Delaware
21
In that case, the
Supreme Court in Coyne v. Park & Tilford Distillers Corp.
22
short-form merger statute was held to be more than procedural in nature;
it conferred a substantive right to merge and eliminate minority interests by
distributing cash for stock surrendered in a merger. 23 The court noted that
the same statute also served to protect the eliminated minority by providing
ally, the agreement must be ratified by a majority vote of the stockholders. Id. § 251.
Section 253, like its long-form counterpart, provides for the conversion of minority
shares into "securities, cash, property or rights." Id. § 253(a). However, a short-form
merger does not require a stockholder vote; rather, the board of directors of the controlling corporation need only resolve to merge and file copies of the executed merger
agreement. Id. § 253. For a discussion of the long and short-form merger requirements, see E. FOLK, THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW (1972).
20. See Brudney & Chirelstein, 4 Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE L.J.
1354, 1356 (1978). Brudney and Chirelstein classify methods of eliminating a minority shareholder's interest by merger into three types: two-step mergers (tender offer
followed by merger of offeror and target); going private transactions (insiders create
holding company for their shares of operating company followed by merger of holding company and operating company with public stockholders of operating company
receiving cash); and mergers of affiliates (merger of subsidiary into parent where public stockholders of subsidiary receive cash). Id. See also Borden, supra note 18, at 9891020; Elfin, Changing Standards and the Future Course of Freezeout Mergers, 5 J. CoRP. L.
261, 261-62 (1980); Greene, Corporate Freeze-out Mergers. A Proposed Analysts, 28 STAN.
L. REV. 487, 491-96 (1976); Lawrie, Corporate Freezeouts." A Comparison of Controls in the
United States and England, 14 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 595, 597-601 (1982).
21. 38 Del. Ch. 514, 154 A.2d 893 (1959). The Coyne plaintiffs sought to enjoin
the consummation of the short-form merger of Park & Tilford with Schenley Industries, its 96% majority shareholder. Id. at 516, 154 A.2d at 894. The plaintiffs argued
that the issuance of cash for their shares would result in their expulsion from an
enterprise in which they had invested, a consequence contrary to "the settled policy
of the law." Id. at 517, 154 A.2d at 895. To support their position they contended
that the recently amended short-form merger statute should be construed in light of
the existing long-form merger procedure which limited the use of cash as consideration for the acquisition of fractional shares. Id.
22. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (1953) (current version at DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 253 (1974 & Supp. 1982)). For a description of the short-form merger procedure,
see note 25 thfra.
23. 38 Del. Ch. at 519, 154 A.2d at 896. The court found that the amendment
to the short-form merger statute, which allows securities, cash or other consideration
to be distributed to minority shareholders, was "a change of substance" and that the
contemplated merger was plainly authorized by the statutory language. Id. The
plaintiffs' "vested rights" theory was, therefore, rejected on the ground that the state
had reserved power to amend corporate charters, a power which the plaintiffs had
accepted with purchase of their stock. Id. at 520, 154 A.2d at 897-98. For a discussion of the vested rights theory, see note 35 infra.
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24
-them with the right to object and demand an appraisal.
These principles were reaffirmed four years later in Staufr v. Standard
Brands, Inc. 25 In that case, the minority shareholders of a subsidiary which
had been merged into its parent had not challenged the propriety of the
parent corporation's use of the short-form merger statute to eliminate their
interest in the surviving corporation. Rather, they sought to set aside the
merger on the grounds that the price offered for their shares was so low as to
constitute constructive fraud. 26 Initially, the court reasoned that since the
dispute centered on the value of the plaintiffs' shares, their sole remedy was
an appraisal. 2 7 The court then recognized its equitable power to deal with
fraud in the merger context, but found that no illegality or overreaching had

24. 38 Del. Ch. at 520, 154 A.2d at 897. For a discussion of a dissenting shareholder's appraisal rights, see notes 34-40 and accompanying text infra.
25. 41 Del. Ch. 7, 187 A.2d 78 (Del. 1962). In Stauffer, minority shareholders
challenged the short-form merger of Planter's of Delaware and Standard Brands. d.
at 8, 187 A.2d at 79. Standard Brands had acquired over 90% of Planter's Nut and
Chocolate Company, by buying both individually-held shares for $105 per share and
a block of about 50% of Planter's shares, held by certain trusts for $115 per share. Id.
at 9, 187 A.2d at 79. Subsequently, Standard Brands created a wholly-owned subsidiary, Planters of Delaware, and merged the two "Planters" companies on a share-forshare exchange. id. Thereafter, Planters of Delaware and Standard Brands merged,
cashing out the minority shareholders of Planter's of Delaware at $105 per share. Id.
at 9, 187 A.2d at 79-80. The plaintiffs contended that the real value of their shares
was between $150 and $160 per share. Id. at 9, 187 A.2d at 80.
26. Id. at 8, 187 A.2d at 80. For a statement of the circumstances in which
Delaware courts found litigants entitled to equitable relief from a merger due to constructive fraud, see Porges v. Vadsco Sales Corp., 27 Del. ch. 127, 32 A.2d 148 (Del.
Ch. 1943) (merger between parent corporation and wholly owned subsidiary to effect
recapitalization of parent would not be enjoined where no misrepresentation, concealment, deception or purpose to promote interests of one class of stock to the detriment of another shown); Cole v. National Cash Credit Ass'n, 18 Del. Ch. 47, 156 A.
183 (Del. Ch. 1931) (duty of stockholder complaining of terms of merger to elect appraisal rights does not arise where the merger was not authorized by law, or was

induced by fraud, or where the terms have resulted from a breach of trust or maladministration which works a manifest wrong to complainants or shows a conscious
abuse of discretion, or where it is shown that those who engineered the merger or
whose voting influence is great enough to accomplish it, are themselves beneficiaries
of alleged inequity); MacFarlane v. North Am. Cement Corp., 16 Del. Ch. 172, 157
A. 396 (Del. Ch. 1928) (court should not prevent merger approved by stockholders
unless it is clear that it would be so injurious and unfair to minority complaining
stockholders as to be shocking, and court is convinced that it is so grossly unfair as to
be fraudulent); Allied Chem. & Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co., 14 Del. Ch. 1, 120 A.
486 (Del. Ch. 1923) (inadequacy of price must be so gross as to lead court to conclude

that it resulted not from honest error of judgment but rather from bad faith or reckless indifference to rights of others interested). For a general discussion of the ability
of dissenting stockholders to attack a merger on the basis of fraud, see 15 FLETCHER
CYC. CORP. § 7160 (rev. Perm. ed. 1983); F. O'NEAL, supra note 18, § 5.29.
27. 41 Del. Ch. at 9, 187 A.2d at 80. The court agreed with the chancery court's
analysis that the relief sought by the plaintiffs was the recovery of the monetary value
of the plaintiff's shares. Id. While the chancery court had rejected the concept of
constructive fraud as grounds for a challenge of a short-form merger since an appraisal was available, the Delaware Supreme Court held that the fraud exception to
the exclusivity of the appraisal remedy applied to all mergers. Id. at 10, 187 A.2d 78,
80.
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been shown. 28 The court went on to state that it would be "difficult to imagine" a case where there could be such actual fraud which would entitle the
minority to equitable relief since the very purpose of the short-form merger
statute was to "provide the parent corporation with a means of eliminating
' 29
the minority."
In Davidj Greene & Co. v. Schenley,3° the chancery court applied the
principles of Coyne and Slau~frr to a long-form merger which effectively eliminated minority shareholders' interests. 3 ' The court in Greene held that the
minority shareholders' right to enjoin the long-form merger was co-extensive
with the right of a cashed-out minority in a short-form merger: where no
fraud or blatant overreaching is demonstrated, their recourse is limited to an
appraisal. 32 Applying this rule, the court determined that the Schenley plain28. Id. at 10, 187 A.2d at 80. The circumstances giving rise to the plaintiff's
claims was an alleged breach of fiduciary duty based on the failure of the Planters
board to obtain an independent or impartial appraisal of the value of that corporation's stock. Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 40 Del. Ch. 202, 207, 178 A.2d 311,
316, aft, 41 Del. Ch. 7, 187 A.2d 78 (Del. 1962). The Delaware Supreme Court
concluded that no illegality or overreaching had been shown when it upheld the
lower court's conclusion that the Planters of Delaware board of directors had no
rights with respect to the merger and therefore, no duty had ever arisen. 41 Del. Ch.
at 10, 187 A.2d at 80. The statutory power of the parent to engage in a unilateral act
which eliminated the minority was found to be a "complete answer" to the plaintiff's
allegations of the Planters board's breach of trust. Id.
29. 41 Del. Ch. at 10-11, 187 A.2d at 80. But see Braasch v. Goldschmidt, 41
Del. Ch. 519, 199 A.2d 760 (Del. Ch. 1964) (stating that while the merger at issue in
Braasch was not a fraudulent end in itself, if the means employed to accomplish that
end, an alleged conspiracy, were unlawful, invalidation of the merger might be
required).
30. 281 A.2d 30 (Del. Ch. 1971). The Schenley plaintiffs were minority stockholders of Schenley Industries, Inc., which was 86%-owned by Glen Alden Corp. d.
at 31. Glen Alden planned to merge Schenley with one of its wholly-owned subsidiaries and distribute cash and debentures to the minority shareholders of Schenley in
exchange for their Schenley stock. Id. at 31-32. In seeking preliminary and permanent injunctive relief against the merger, the plaintiffs contended that the terms of
the merger were so grossly unfair as to amount to an attempt by self-dealing officers
and directors to eliminate the minority to the advantage of Glen Alden. Id. at 31.
The basis of the plaintiffs' allegations lay in their contention that the price being
offered to them in 1971 was far below Schenley's 1968 market price. Id. at 34. For a
brief discussion of the procedures involved in a long-form merger under DEL. CODe
ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (1974 & Supp. 1982), see note 19supra.
31. 281 A.2d at 30.
32. Id. at 35 (citing Stauffer, 41 Del. Ch. at 7, 187 A.2d at 78). Compare Bruce v.
E. L. Bruce Co., 40 Del. Ch. 80, 174 A.2d 29 (Del. Ch. 1961) (court would not enjoin
merger or look into purpose of merger where no fraud or blatant overreaching shown
stating, "[J]udicial interference is inappropriate in most instances of merger because
an efficient and fair method has been provided which permits judicially protected
withdrawal by stockholders from a proposed consolidation") with David J. Greene &
Co. v. Dunhill Int'l, Inc., 249 A.2d 427 (Del. Ch. 1968) (motion of minority stockholders of subsidiary to enjoin preliminarily merger between subsidiary and its parent corporation granted where evidence that defendant had failed to disclose its
diversion of a corporate opportunity from the subsidiary diversion would have affected the earnings of the subsidiary was relevant in determination of entire fairness
of merger terms).
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tiffs, who had alleged constructive fraud, were not entitled to equitable relief
since the defendants had demonstrated that the amount being offered the
33
minority approximated the fair value of their shares.
The appraisal remedy, to which the Coyne, Staufer and Schenley plaintiffs
were relegated, is entirely a creature of statute. 34 In general, appraisal stat33. 281 A.2d at 32-35. Since the defendant-acquiror, was also the controlling
stockholder of the corporation to be acquired, the Schenley court stated that "the rule
applicable in all instances of corporate self-dealing, namely that when officers and
directors stand on both sides of a transaction complained of '. .. they bear the burden of establishing its entire fairness, and it (the transaction) must pass the test of
careful scrutiny by the courts'" was applicable. Id. at 32 (quoting Sterling v.
Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 298, 93 A.2d 107, 110 (Del. 1952) (action by
minority shareholders of subsidiary challenging exchange ratio of stock-for-stock
merger into its parent corporation wherein court required interested defendant to
prove entire fairness of merger terms: that upon the merger the minority stockholder
would receive the substantial equivalent in value of what he held prior to the
merger.). See also Keenan v. Eshelman, 23 Del. Ch. 234, 2 A.2d 904 (Del. 1938);
Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp., 38 Del. Ch. 82, 90 A.2d 660 (Del. 1952) (business judgment rule not applicable to corporate action where majority of directors
conferring benefit on themselves, rather, burden on directors to prove transaction in
good faith and that its intrinsic fairness will withstand a searching and objective
analysis). In its application of the principles of Sterling, the Schenley court determined
that
the matter to be decided is the fair value of the offer being made to plaintiffs. . . and whether or not this amount approximates the fair value of the
shares of Schenley which the plan proposes to eliminate . . . unless the fair
value of Schenley stock is so much greater than the total amount offered, or
that plaintiffs . . . are being otherwise deprived of clear rights or otherwise
so taken advantage of by those charged with a fiduciary duty towards them
as to constitute a form of constructive fraud, or the like, then it would appear that the parties are merely in dispute as to value, for which an appraisal should be adequate.
281 A.2d at 33. In addition, the court commented that in determining the fair value
of the plaintiffs stock, "the basic reality of Glen Alden's control of Schenley should
be considered, that is, that the merger laws of Delaware put the plaintiffs on constructive notice that they could be lawfully eliminated." Id. at 35.
34. Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy. An Essay for Frank Coker, 72
YALE L.J. 223, 226 (1962). For a discussion of Coyne, Stauffer and Schenley, see notes
21-33 and accompanying text supra. Historically, Delaware has recognized the right
to appraisal only in the case of a merger or consolidation. E. FOLK, supra note 19, at
372-73. The circumstances which give rise to appraisal rights have been curtailed
over time and currently are contained in DEL.. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b) (Supp.
1982). See E. FOLK, supra note 19, at 383. Generally, that section provides that the
stockholders of a constituent corporation in a long-form merger are entitled to appraisal rights, unless their stock is 1) listed on a national securities exchange; or
2) held of record by more than 2,000 stockholders; or 3) is in the survivign corporation and was not required to be voted in approving the merger. See DEE. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 262(b)(1) (Supp. 1982). However, the statute also provides that, notwithstanding the above, appraisal rights shall be available for shares of stock in a constituent corporation if the stockholders are required by the merger terms to accept
anything except: 1) shares in the surviving corporation; 2) shares in a corporation
listed on a national exchange or held of record by more than 2,000 stockholders; or
3) cash in lieu of fractional shares described in 1) and 2). See id. § 262(b)(2). Thus,
stockholders who are required by the merger terms to accept cash are entitled to
appraisal rights. The statute further provides that appraisal rights are available to
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utes were originally enacted to provide relief to shareholders who dissented
from corporate action but were unable to block that action, due to the relaxation of the common law requirement that corporations obtain unanimous
shareholder approval of fundamental corporate changes. 35 Under the Delaware appraisal statute, a dissenting shareholder who has "perfected" his ap36
praisal rights is entitled to the judicially determined value of his shares.
stockholders of a subsidiary corporation in a short-form merger, povided that immediately prior to the merger the parent corporation does not own all of the stock in the
subsidiary. See id. § 262(b)(3).
35. See generally, 13 FLETCHER Cyc. CORP. § 5906.1 (rev. Perm. ed. 1980);
O'NEAL, supra note 18 at § 5.27; W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON CORPORATIONS Ch. 10, § 1(c) (5th ed. 1980). At common law a corporation

could not engage in a merger or other fundamental corporate change without the
unanimous consent of stockholders. Recognizing the modern corporations' need for
flexibility, all of the states eventually enacted statutes permitting less than unanimous
approval of these basic corporate changes. As explained by the Delaware Supreme
Court:
When the idea became generally accepted that, in the interest of adjusting
corporate mechanisms to the requirements of business and commercial
growth, mergers should be permitted in spite of the opposition of minorities,
statutes were enacted in state after state which took from the individual
stockholder the right theretofore existing to defeat the welding of his corporation with another.
Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 20 Del. Ch. 142, 149, 172 A. 452, 455 (Del. 1934). See also
Carney, Fundamental Corporate Changes, Mzt'ority Shareholders, and Bustiness Purposes, 1980
AM. B. FOUNDATION RFS. J. 69 (1980); Toms, Compensating Shareholders Frozen Out 1n
Two-Step Mergers, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 548, 566 n.63 (1978). See generally Greene, supra
note 20, at 487-89; Manning, supra note 34, at 246-47 & n.38. In Delaware, the appraisal statute was enacted to compensate dissenting shareholders for the abrogation
of their right to prevent changes in the corporate structure. See Meade v. Pacific
Gamble Robinson Co., 29 Del. Ch. 406, 51 A.2d 313 (Del. Ch. 1947), affd, 30 Del.
Ch. 509, 58 A.2d 415 (Del. 1948); Francis I. duPont & Co. v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 343 A.2d 629 (Del. Ch. 1975). For a discussion of the view that appraisal rights
were a necessary enactment to preserve the constitutionality of statutes which enabled fundamental corporate changes to occur on less than a unanimous vote, see
Manning, supra note 34, at 246-47 n.38. For the view that appraisal statutes were
enacted as a matter of fairness rather than compulsion, see M. EISENBERG, THE
STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 75 (1976). See generally,
Note, Valuation of Dissenters' Stock Under Appraisal Statutes, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1453,
1455-56 (1966).
36. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (Supp. 1982). The method for perfecting appraisal rights has undergone much legislative change in Delaware. Prior to amendments to the statute occurring in 1976, the process of perfecting the appraisal remedy
had been labeled "tortuous", "unattractive and complex", and "inferior." See E.
FOLK, supra note 19, at 375; Manning, supra note 34, at 231. See also Green v. Santa
Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976) (Mansfield, J., concurring), rev'd, 430
U.S. 462 (1977). For a discussion of Santa Fe see notes 41-52 and accompanying text
thfra. The dissenting shareholder was required to object to the merger in writing
prior to the vote on the proposed transaction. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b)
(Supp. 1982). Once the objection was made, the shareholder could not vote in favor
of the merger. Id. Even though the shareholder had objected to the transaction and
refrained from voting in its favor, the statute required that he or she make a written
demand for payment within 20 days after notice of the filing of the merger agreement
had been given by the corporation. Id. Assuming that appraisal rights were perfected by the foregoing, if the corporation and the shareholder were unable to agree
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The statute directs that the court consider "all relevant factors" bearing
upon the value of the shareholder's stock, "exclusive of any element of value
arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger." ' 37 The Delaware courts interpreted this language as requiring a determination of the
on the value of the dissident shares, either one could then file a petition in the court
of chancery demanding valuation by an appraiser. Id. at § 252(c). For a discussion
of the technicalities and complexity of issues arising under the procedure described
above, see E. FOLK, supra note 19 at 375-77; Kerr & Letts, Appraisal Proceduresfor
Dissenting Delaware Stockholders, 20 Bus. LAW. 1083, 1085-90 (1965).
In an apparent response to judicial opinion, in 1976 the legislature amended the
procedures required for perfecting the appraisal remedy. 60 Del. Laws 371 (976)
(codified as amended at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(d) (Supp. 1982). See W. GARY
& H. EISENBERG, supra note 35, at 1461 n.4 (citing Raab v. Villager Indus., Inc., 355
A.2d 888 (Del.), cert. denied 429 U.S. 853 (1976); Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533
F.2d 1283, 1297 n.4 (2d Cir. 1976) (Mansfield, J., concurring), rev'd, 430 U.S. 462
(1977)). As currently codified, the process requires that the corporation notify shareholders of their appraisal rights not less than 20 days prior to the date approval is
sought on the transaction. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(d) (Supp. 1982). The notification is to contain a copy of the appraisal statute, thus enabling previously uninformed shareholders to act. Id. Once notified and prior to any vote on the proposed
transaction, the shareholder must make a general written demand of the corporation
which would reasonably inform the corporation of the shareholder's intent to demand an appraisal. Id. If the shareholder has refrained from voting in favor of the
merger, either the corporation or the shareholder may file a petition in the Court of
Chancery demanding an appraisal of the value of all dissenters' shares. Id.
The Delaware statute originally required the determination of value of the dissenter's stock be made by a court-appointed appraiser. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 262() (Supp. 1982). After the parties had an opportunity to present evidence of
value, the appraiser was to file his report with the court. See id. The chancery court,
after hearing any objections then determined the value of the stock by decree. Id. In
1976, the legislature revised this procedure by requiring the chancery court to make
the sole determination of value. 60 Del. Laws 371 (1976) (codified as amended at
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (Supp. 1982)).
Once the proceedings have begun, the Delaware courts have historically disregarded any issues other than valuation. See Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 413 A.2d
137 (Del. 1980) (entire fairness of merger giving rise to appraisal proceeding not an
issue to be considered); Kaye v. Pantone, Inc., 395 A.2d 369 (Del. Ch. 1978) (counterclaim for malicious prosecution against dissenting shareholder denied); Lichtman v.
Recognition Equip., Inc., 295 A.2d 771 (Del. Ch. 1972) (permitting injection of issues
requiring proceedings of adversarial nature could only serve to complicate sole issue
of valuation). But see Lebman v. Nat'l Union Elec. Corp. 414 A.2d 824 (Del. Ch.
1980) (proper business purpose existed for merger underlying appraisal proceeding).
For a general discussion of the use and application of the Delaware appraisal statute,
see Grant, The Delaware Appraisal Statute, 6 DEL. J. CORP. L. 590 (1981).
37. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (Supp. 1982). Historically the Delaware
statute required a determination of "value". See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (1975).
However, due to amendments occurring in 1976 and 1981, the statute now requires a
determination of "fair value". DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (Supp. 1982). The
statute currently provides as follows:
(h) After determining the stockholders entitled to an appraisal, the
Court shall appraise the shares, determining their fair value exclusive of any
element of value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the
merger, together with a fair rate of interest, if any, to be paid upon the
amount determined to be the fair value. In determining such fair value, the
Court shall take into account all relevant factors.
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value of a dissident shareholder's proportionate interest in a "going concern." 38 To make this determination, the Delaware courts employed a
method commonly known as the "Delaware block approach. '3 9 Under this
approach, a dollar figure was assigned to the relevant value factors (market
value, asset value and earnings value) followed by the assignment of an appropriate weight to each element of value, from which a weighted average
40
value of the merging corporation was derived.
Believing that the Delaware appraisal remedy did not adequately pro4
tect their interests, plaintiff-shareholders in Santa Fe Industries v. Green '
sought to enjoin a short-form merger on the grounds that the merger violated section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule
lOb-5. 42 Plaintiffs argued that both the gross undervaluation of their shares,
38. The standard by which the fair value of a dissenter's shares is to be determined under the Delaware appraisal statute was set forth by the Delaware Supreme
Court. See Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 31 Del. Ch. 523, 74 A.2d 71 (Del. 1950)
(appraisal proceeding brought by shareholders dissenting from merger). In Tn-Conti
nental, the court stated,
The basic concept of value under the appraisal statute is that the stockholder is entitled to be paid for that which has been taken from him, viz.,
his proportionate interest in a going concern. By value of the stockholder's
proportionate interest in the corporate enterprise is meant the true or intrinsic value of his stock which has been taken by the merger. In determining what figure represents this true or intrinsic value, the appraiser and the
courts must take into consideration all factors and elements which reasonably might enter into the fixing of value. Thus, market value, asset value,
dividends, earning prospects, the nature of the enterprise and any other
facts which were known or which could be ascertained as the date of merger
and which throw any light on future prospects of the merged corporation
are not only pertinent to an inquiry as to the value of dissenting stockholders' interest, but must be considered by the agency fixing the value.
Id. at 526, 74 A.2d at 72. Delaware courts have treated the "going concern" requirement as mandating a determination of the value of the corporation's shares in reference to the corporation as it existed prior to the transaction, rather than in its value
to an acquiror. See Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 413 A.2d 137, 142 (Del. 1980);
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Francis I. duPont & Co., 42 Del. Ch. 406, 334 A.2d
216 (Del. 1975); In re Application of Delaware Racing Ass'n, 42 Del. Ch. 406, 213
A.2d 203 (Del. 1965).
39. See Piemonte v. New Boston Garden Corp., 377 Mass. 719, 724, 387 N.E.2d
1145, 1148 (1979).
40. See W. CARv & M. EISENBERG, supra note 39, at 129-36, 1456-61; E. FoLK,
supra note 19 at 380-87; Schaefer, The Fallacyof Weghtmg Asset Value and Earmihgs Value
in the Appraisal of Corporate Stock, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1031 (1982). For cases illustrating this approach, see Poole v. N. V. Deli Maatschappij, 243 A.2d 67 (Del. 1968); In
re Application of Delaware Racing Ass'n, 42 Del. Ch. 406, 213 A.2d 203 (Del. 1965);
Jacques Coe & Co. v. Minneapolis-Moline Co., 31 Del. Ch. 368, 75 A.2d 244 (Del.
Ch. 1950); In re General Realty & Utilities Corp., 29 Del. Ch. 480, 52 A.2d 6 (Del.
Ch. 1947); Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 20 Del. Ch. 142, 172 A. 452 (Del. Ch. 1934).
41. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
42. Id. at 464 (citing Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j(b) (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(c) (1981)). Plaintiffs were minority shareholders of Kirby Lumber Co. Id. at 466. In 1974, Santa Fe Industries, Kirby's parent
corporation, merged with Kirby through a wholly-owned subsidiary of Santa Fe pursuant to the Delaware short-form merger statute. Id. at 465. The day after the effec-
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and the merger itself, although complying with Delaware Law, 43 constituted
fraudulent and deceptive practices within the meaning of Rule lOb-5. 4 4 The
Second Circuit held that even though there had been full disclosure, a cashout merger with no valid corporate purpose was fraudulent in itself.45 While
the Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit, 46 commentary by the Court
and Judge Mansfield, who had concurred with the Second Circuit, shed
some light on existing Delaware Law.
In addition to highlighting the problems that could be created by misuse of the Delaware merger statute, 47 Judge Mansfield disclosed what he felt
were the inadequacies of the Delaware appraisal remedy. 48 He noted that
tive date of the merger, the minority shareholders of Kirby wre informed of the
merger terms which provided for a $150 payment for each share of Kirby. 430 U.S.
at 466. They were also informed that, if dissatisfied with the price, they could seek
appraisal. Id. The plaintiff, using financial information that had also been disclosed,
determined that the Kirby stock was worth at least $772 per share. Id. at 466-67.
43. Id. at 466.
44. Green v. Santa Fe Indus., 533 F.2d 1283, 1285 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S.
462 (1977). The plaintiff claimed that the Delaware short-form merger procedure as
applied to the Kirby merger constituted a "device, scheme, or artifice to defraud"
due to the gross undervaluation of the Kirby stock. Further, plaintiff contended that
the merger itself violated Rule lOb-5 because the elimination of the minority shareholders was accomplished by a breach of fiduciary duty by the majority shareholders
due to their forcing the plaintiffs to sell their stock at a price far below its value with
no proper purpose. Id. at 1285.
45. Id. at 1292. The Second Circuit held that neither nondisclosure nor misrepresentation was an essential element of an action brought under Rule lOb-5. Id. at
1287. It found that, the plaintiffs were forced sellers of securities in interstate commerce and that there was a causal connection between the alleged breach of fiduciary
duty and the alleged injury to the minority shareholders. Id.
46. 430 U.S. at 474, 476. The Supreme Court held that the language of Rule
lOb-5 required a showing of manipulation or deception. Id. at 473-4. Since there
had been no deception or manipulation, there had been no violation of either section
10(b) or Rule lOb-5. Id. at 474. For a complete discussion of the facts and decisions
in the Santa Fe case, see Note, Sante Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green: The Supreme Court
Reaffirms the Necessity of Non-Disclosure to Maintain an Action Under Rule 10b-5, 3 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 76 (1977). See also Ferrara Steinberg, A Reappraisalof Santa Fe: Rule 1Ob-5
and the New Federahm, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 263 (1980).
47. 533 F.2d at 1294-96 (Mansfield, J., concurring). By "going public" when
the market is high and cashing out minority shareholders when the market is depressed, Mansfield found that the majority is able to manipulate the purchase and
sale of stock to its benefit and to the detriment of the public shareholders, involuntarily depriving them of their investment. Id. (citing Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the Dissentig Shareholder'sAppraisalRight, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1189 (1964)). Furthermore, the
majority are able to unilaterally set the terms of the merger and have an incentive to
fix the price below the fair value of the public shareholders' interest. 533 F.2d at
1295 (citing Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88
HARV. L. REv. 297, 298 (1974)). See also W. CARY & M. EISENBERC, supra note 35 at
1456-59. Cary and Eisenberg have stated that "many aspects of the approach taken
in [appraisal] cases is highly questionable, and the result may be a gross undervaluation, as compared to real world values. This in turn diminishes the usefulness of the
appraisal right, and opens up the possibility of manipulation, by those in control, to
squeeze out the minority at unfairly low prices." Id. at 456.
48. 533 F.2d at 1297 n.4.
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under the appraisal statute, cashed-out minority shareholders were not entitled to any gain resulting from the merger. Any economic gain was distributed solely to the insiders. 49 Furthermore, Judge Mansfield was troubled by
several procedural inadequacies: 1) the inability of a dissenting shareholder
who initiates proceedings to share his costs with fellow dissenters; 2) the exclusion of attorneys fees from any recovery; 3) the lengthy nature of the proceedings; and 4) the limited availability of discovery. 50 Although the
49. Id. See Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 47, at 297 (fiduciary obligation of
fairness requires that in parent-subsidiary mergers, public stockholders of subsidiary
be paid a price which includes their pro rata share of any gain accruing to merged
corporation as a result of merger, analogizing division of gain to that required of
trustee managing trust accounts on behalf of separate beneficiaries having similar
objectives); Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited Reflections on Recent Developments
in Delaware's CorporationLaw, 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 913 (1982) (freeze-out is mechanism

enabling purchasers of control to recoup costs of acquiring control by appropriating
any gains from the transfer of control, therefore, to increase frequency of these value
added transactions, majority should not be required to share any gains resulting from
its acquisition of 100% control with frozen out shareholders); In addition, Judge
Mansfield criticized the retrospective application of the "Delaware block approach"
which required the earnings of the merged corporation to be determined on an historical basis. 533 F.2d at 1297 n.4 (citing Francis I. duPont & Co. v. Universal City
Studios, 312 A.2d 344 (Del. Ch. 1973)). See also Schaefer, supra note 401, at 1031
(using weighted average of the value of the corporation when assets used in their best
use and value of the corporation when assets employed in less profitable results in
undervaluation); Weiss, The Law of Takeout Mergers: A fhistoricalPerspective, 56 N.Y.U.

L. REV. 624 (1981) (weighting method ignores insider's capabilities of maximizing
efficiency of corporation after a merger).
50. 533 F.2d at 1297-98 n.4. At the time Judge Mansfield filed his concurring
opinion, the Delaware appraisal statute contemplated the apportionment of costs of
the proceedings, exclusive of attorneys' and experts' fees, as appears to be equitable.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (1975). The general rule by the courts was that,
absent evidence of bad faith on the part of the dissenting shareholder, the corporation bears the costs of the proceeding. E. FOLK, supra note 19, at 389. Attorneys' fees
and experts' fees were only to be paid by the petitioning dissenters; non-petitioning
dissenters received the appraisal value of their shares without having to absorb part
of the expenses for attorneys and experts. Id. Because the statute called for a determination of value by an appraiser, followed by review of that determination by the
chancery court, the appraisal process was both lengthy and expensive. See
Crompton, Changes in the Merger Provisions of the Delaware General CorporationLaw Since
/967, 3 DEL. J. CORP. L. 303, 305 (1978). Discovery by dissenting shareholders was
within the discretion of the court. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(e) (1975). As one

commentator noted, the crucial valuation evidence is normally held by the corporation and unavailable to dissenting shareholders, making it difficult to establish a
higher stock value than that offered by management. Brudney, A Note on Going Private, 61 VA. L. REV. 1019, 1024 n.21 (1975). While the statute did not allow interim
payments to dissenters, it did provide for the payment of interest from the effective
date of the merger to the payment date. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (1975).
The 1976 and 1981 amendments to the appraisal statute have addressed some of
Judge Mansfield's criticisms. Section 2620) now permits the court to order all or a
portion of the expenses incurred by any stockholder, including attorneys' and experts'
fees, to be charged pro rata against the value of all the shares entitled to an appraisal.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 2620) (Supp. 1982). Thus the "free-rider" problem has
been eliminated and the proceedings more closely resemble a class action brought on
behalf of all those dissenting shareholders who have perfected their appraisal rights.
The time delays previously encountered in appraisal proceedings have been amelio-
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Supreme Court was reluctant to extend section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 to
"cover the corporate universe," 5 1 it implied its dissatisfaction with appraisal
as a remedy for cashed-out shareholders by noting that "there may well be a
need for uniform federal fiduciary standards to govern mergers such as that
challenged .... *"52
In an apparent reaction to the restrictive approach to the appraisal
remedy, 53 the possibility of federal regulation of the fiduciary standards governing mergers, 54 and the lack of judicial scrutiny into the entire fairness of
cash-out mergers, 55 the Delaware Supreme Court handed down a trilogy of
opinions which reexamined the protections to be afforded minority share56
holders in cash-out mergers.
The first decision of this trilogy was Singer v. Magnavox Co.57 The trans-

action at issue in Singer was the long-form merger of Magnavox into a shell
corporation which had been created by North American Phillips Corporation, the majority shareholder of Magnavox. 58 Alleging that the sole purrated to some extent by the provision dispensing with the mandatory appointment of
an appraiser, thus placing all proceedings before the chancery court, and the provision enabling all dissenters to participate in pretrial proceedings and trial upon the
appraisal until those entitled to appraisal have been determined, thus enabling discovery to proceed at the same time that qualification determinations are being made.
Id. § 262(h). See also Crompton, supra at 305. The availability remains at the chancellor's discretion. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (Supp. 1982).
51. 430 U.S. at 479-80.
52. Id.

53. See notes 46-49 and accompanying text supra.
54. See notes 51-52 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of Santa Fe
and its effect on Delaware law, see Ferrara & Steinberg, supra note 46, at 263; Note,
supra note 46, at 76. For pre-1977 commentary urging federal regulation of corporate
law, see Cary, Federahsmand Corporate Law: Refltections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663
(1974); Schwartz, Towards New Corporate Goals: Co-existence with Society, 60 GEO. L.J.
57 (1971). But see Arsht, Reply to Professor Cary, 31 Bus. LAw. 1113 (1976). For a

general analysis of federalization of state corporate law, see Fischel, supra note 49, at
913; Ruder, CorporateGovernance: An Analysis of Duties, Atttacks, and Responses, 4 DEL.J.
CORP. L. 741 (1979).
55. One commentator has suggested that contemporary opinion felt
that Staufer
and itsprogeny rendered a review of the entire fairness of an interested cash-out
merger unnecessary when appraisal rights were available to dissenting shareholders.
See Weiss, supra note 49, at 655 (citing Arsht, Minority Stockholder Freezeouts Under Delaware Law, 32 Bus. LAW 1495 (1977); Balotti, The Elimination of the Miority Interests by
Mergers Pursuantto Section 251 of the GeneralCorporation Law of Delaware, I DEL. J. CORP.

L. 63, 67-77 (1976)). As contemporaneously explained by Professor Folk, despite the
reaffirmation of the entire fairness standard in Davidj. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Intl,

Inc., the Schenley decision indicated that the Delaware courts would be likely to pay
only "lip service" to it.E.FOLK, supra note 19 at 334-36 (1st ed. 1972) (citing David
J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int'l, Inc., 249 A.2d 427, 431 (Del. Ch. 1968) (parentsubsidiary merger); Schenley, 281 A.2d at 30. For a discussion of Schenley, see notes 3033 and accompanying text supra.
56. For a discussion of these decisions, see notes 57-74 and accompanying text
supra.

57. 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
58. Id. at 971. North American Phillips Corporation (North American), a subsidiary of Phillips, a Dutch electronics corporation, incorporated North American
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pose of the merger was the elimination of the Magnavox minority
shareholders at a grossly inadequate price, the plaintiffs, minority shareholders of Magnavox, sought an order nullifying the merger and compensatory
damages. 59 The Delaware Supreme Court rejected the defendants' assertion
that appraisal was the plaintiffs' exclusive remedy. 60 Instead, the court applied fiduciary principles to the merger, which required a demonstration of
the "entire fairness" of the transaction. 6 ' The court held that a majority
Development Corporation (Development) for the sole purpose of making a tender
offer for Magnavox stock. Id. Magnavox withdrew its opposition to the merger after
negotiations resulted in both an increase in the price per share offered and the provision of employment contracts for some of the Magnavox officers. Id. As a result of its
tender offer, Development acquired 84.1% of Magnavox's outstanding common
stock. Id. Subsequently, Development created T.M.C. Development Corporation
(TMC) for the purpose of acquiring the remaining equity interests in Magnavox. Id.
The Magnavox directors, four of whom were directors of North American and three
others of whom had employment contracts with Magnavox and options to purchase
North American stock upon the merger's consummation, unanimously agreed to the
merger. Id. at 972. Notice of the stockholder meeting for approving the merger was
sent to shareholders with a proxy which disclosed that the book value of their stock
was in excess of the merger price per share and that the shareholders had appraisal
rights. Id. In addition, the shareholders were informed that the merger would be
approved as a result of Development's ability to vote the requisite number of shares.
Id. At the shareholders' meeting, the requisite approval was obtained and the
merger was consummated. Id.
59. id. The plaintiffs prayer for injunctive relief was based on their contention
that the merger was unfair because Development obtained a disproportionate
amount of the gains to be recognized from the merger. Id. at 978. The plaintiffs also
asserted that the defendants, as controlling stockholders, had breached their fiduciary
duty to the minority shareholders by approving the merger at a cash price which they
knew to be inadequate. Id. at 971. In addition, the plaintiffs contended that the
merger was violative of the anti-fraud provisions of the Delaware Securities Act. Id.
(citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 7303 (1975)). This final cause of action was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds. Id. at 980-82.
60. Id. at 977 (citing Vorenberg, supra note 47, at 1189). Many commentators
have viewed the court's citation to Vorenberg as evidence of its discontent with the
appraisal remedy. See, e.g., Note, Singer v. Magnavox Co.,: Delaware Imposes Reslrlctions on FreezeoutMergers, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 118, 131 n.65 (1978). The court reasoned
that because shareholders have a legally protected interest in the form as well as the
value of their investment, the majority cannot eliminate the minority interest without
a valid purpose. Id. at 978. Thus, the court set forth the minority shareholder's right
to a continued equitable participation in the corporate enterprise, which right arises
from fiducial principles, not fact of stock ownership. Id. For criticism of this reasoning, see Fischel, supra note 49, at 913. In dismissing the defendant's argument, the
Snger court attempted to distinguish Stauffer and Schenley on the grounds that neither
case involved an expulsion of minority shareholders where the only purpose of the
merger at issue was their elimination. 380 A.2d at 978. However, the court did state
that any statements contained therein which were inconsistent with its opinion were
overruled. Id. at 979. For a discussion of the Staufer and Schenley cases, see notes 2533 and accompanying text supra.
61. 380 A.2d at 976. The court stated that statutory compliance with the
merger statute would not insulate the merger from review. Id. at 975 (citing Schnell
v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971); Guth v. Loft, 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5
A.2d 503 (Del. 1939)). Rather, the court asserted that, as a majority shareholder, the
defendants owed the minority a fiduciary obligation which "is the cornerstone of
plaintiffs' rights in [the] controversy and the corollary, of course, is that it is likewise
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shareholder's use of the corporate machinery for the sole purpose of eliminating minority stockholders was not a valid business purpose and was, therefore, a breach of its fiduciary duty to the minority. 62 In addition, the court
concluded that entire fairness could not be proven by a valid business purpose alone; the circumstances of the merger and its terms must also meet the
standard of entire fairness. 63 Finally, the Singer court established that if a
court finds that a majority shareholder has breached its fiduciary duty by
violating either of these two prongs of the entire fairness standard, it is free to
64
grant such relief as equity may require.
In Tanzer v. International General Industries, Inc. ,65 the court elaborated
upon the "business purpose test" which it had set forth in Singer.66 The
Tanzer plaintiffs had sought a preliminary injunction against a cash-out
merger which they alleged was for the sole benefit of the parent corporation.6 7 The Delaware Supreme Court held that a freeze-out merger which
serves the sole interest of the majority shareholder has a proper business purpose. 68 The court cautioned, however, that the purpose for the merger must
the measure of duty owed by the defendants." Id. (citing Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107 (Del. 1952) (majority shareholder in interested merger has burden of proving entire fairness); Bastian v. Bourns, Inc., 256 A.2d
680 (Del. Ch. 1969), ajd, 278 A.2d 467 (Del. 1970) (fiduciary duty of majority stockholder who controlled both parties to merger required that interests of minority
stockholders be dealt with in entirely fair manner); David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill
Int'l, Inc., 249 A.2d 427 (Del. Ch. 1968) (intrinsic fairness is litmus test of interested
merger)).
62. 380 A.2d at 978. The court reasoned that since the use of the corporate
machinery to perpetuate control violates fiduciary principles, "[b]y analogy, if not a
fort:ori, the use of corporate power solely to ehminate the minority" is likewise a violation of fiduciary duty. Id. at 980 (emphasis in original). For a discussion of this
analysis, see Weiss, supra note 49, at 624. For a discussion of the origins and utility of
the business purpose test, see Carney, supra note 35, at 69.
63. 380 A.2d at 980. While the majority did not elaborate upon how a determination of entire fairness was to be made, Justice McNeilly, in his concurring opinion,
stated that the court should scrutinize "the business purpose, or economic necessity,
desirability and feasibility involved, evidence of self-serving, manipulation, or overreaching, and all other relevant factors of intrinsic fairness or unfairness." Id. at 982
(McNeilly, J., concurring).
64. Id. at 980.
65. 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977).
66. Id. at 1123-25. For a discussion of the business purpose test as set forth by
the Snger court, see note 62 and accompanying text, supra.
67. 379 A.2d at 1122. The plaintiffs in Tanzer were stockholders of Kliklok Corporation (Kliklok), 87% of which was owned by International General Industries,
Inc. (IGI). Id. To acquire the remaining shares of Kliklok, IGI formed a shell corporation, KLK, which it merged with Kliklok. Id. Under the terms of the merger KLK
was to receive all of the Kliklok stock and the minority was to be paid $11 per share.
Id. at 1123. The plaintiffs sought to preliminarily enjoin the merger arguing that a
freeze-out merger imposed on a subsidiary by a parent corporation, if designed for
the sole benefit of the parent, was a violation of the fiduciary duty owed by the
parent to its subsidiary. Id. As asserted by the plaintiffs and found by the lower
court, the sole purpose for the merger was to facilitate long-term debt financing by
the parent, IGI. Id. at 1123-24.
68. Id. at 1123-24. The court based its holding on the grounds that IGI had a
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be bonafde, that is, it must not be a subterfuge, the real purpose of which is
69
to eliminate unwanted stockholders from the enterprise.
fundamental right to vote its shares in its own interest. Id. at 1123 (citing Ringling
Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Comedy Shows v. Ringling, 29 Del. Ch. 610, 622, 53 A.2d
441, 447 (Del. 1947) (shareholder may exercise wide liberality of judgment in voting
his shares and may vote for his own motives so long as he violates no duty owed to
fellow shareholders); Heil v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 17 Del. Ch. 214, 216, 151 A.
303, 304 (1930) (when voting, stockholder may admit personal profit, whims and
caprice into his motive, so long as no advantage is obtained at expense of fellow
stockholders); Allied Chem. & Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co., 14 Del. Ch. 1, 11, 120
A. 486, 491 (1923) (subject to fairness rule, majority has right to sell corporate assets
over objection of minority shareholders)).
69. 379 A.2d at 1124. The court found that the benefit of facilitated long-term
debt financing that would accrue to the parent as a result of the merger was a bona
fide business purpose which did not violate the rule of Singer. Id. at 1125. See also
Dower v. Mosser Indus., 648 F.2d 183 (3d Cir. 1981) (under Delaware law elimination of minority to increase profits from a new venture was a proper business purpose); Coleman v. Taub, 487 F. Supp. 118 (D. Del. 1980), rev'd, 638 F.2d 628 (3d Cir.
1981) (termination of minority shareholder's derivative suit by elimination of minority shareholder not a bonafrte business purpose for merger); Field v.Allyn, 457 A.2d
1089 (Del. 1983) (elimination of minority shareholders in order to assure lender's
ability to honor financial commitments was proper business purpose); Young v.
Valhi, Inc., 382 A.2d 1372 (Del. Ch. 1978) (tax savings that could be accomplished
by other means and elimination of remote potential conflicts of interest not a valid
business purpose). For contemporaneous commentary on the practical effects of the
business purpose test in planning a merger, see Terrell, Planmng a Cash Merger After
Singer, 4 DEL. J. CORP. L. 720 (1979). See also McBride, Delaware Corporate Law.
Jud czal Scrutiny of Mergers-The Aftermath of Singer v. The Magnavox Company, 33
Bus. LAw. 2231 (1978).
The Tanzer court went on to emphasize the dual nature of the Singer test by

remanding the case for judicial scrutiny of the "entire fairness" as to all aspects of the
transaction. 379 A.2d at 1125. The court reasoned that given the fiduciary duty
owed by IGI to the minority stockholders of Kliklok, the plaintiffs were entitled to a
Singer fairness hearing even though the court had affirmed the chancellor's denial of
preliminary injunctive relief. Id. The court stated that the chancery court's earlier
inquiry into the fairness of the merger in terms of the price to be paid to the minority
was too restrictive and that the second prong of the Stiger test required scrutiny of
"all aspects" of the transaction. Id.
On remand, the chancery court was directly confronted with two issues yet unresolved by the Delaware Supreme Court: 1) the proper allocation of the burden of
proving entire fairness of a merger which was ratified by a majority of the minority
shareholders; and 2) the proper method of determining whether or not the merger
was "entirely fair." Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., Inc., 402 A.2d 382, 386-87
(Del. Ch. 1979). Turning first to the burden of proof, the chancery court recognized
that if the merger had not been ratified by the minority shareholders, the burden
would lie on the dominant stockholder to prove entire fairness since he stood on both
sides of the transaction. Id. at 386 (citing Singer, 380 A.2d at 969; Harriman v. E. I.
Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 411 F. Supp. 133 (D. Del. 1975)). The court avoided the
parties' arguments concerning the effect of minority ratification by equating the "entire fairness" review, required by the supreme court's opinion, with "intrinsic fairness," which places the burden of proof on the proponent of the merger with careful
scrutiny by the court. 402 A.2d at 386 (citing Harriman v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours
& Co., 411 F. Supp. 133 (D. Del. 1975); Nathan & Shapiro, Legal Standards of Fairness
of Merger Terms Under Delaware Law, 2 DEl. J. CORP. L. 44 (1977)).
Confronting the meaning of "entire fairness" the court surveyed the case law
and found it to be of "limited guidance." Tanzer, 402 A.2d at 387. In evaluating the
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In the third of its trilogy of opinions, Roland International Corp. v. Naj/ar ,70
the Delaware Supreme Court reasoned that the fiduciary obligations owed
in an interested merger do not change with the amount of shares owned by
the majority; therefore, it applied the principles of Singer and Tanzer to a
short-form merger. 7 1 In reaching this conclusion, the court rejected the defairness of the merger at issue the court inquired into eight criteria suggested by the
parties: 1) the purpose of the merger; 2) alternatives to the merger; 3) independent
recommendations as to the fairness of the merger price; 4) disclosure to the minority
shareholders; 5) whether or not the corporation had "gone private" when the stock
was trading at a low price after its public issue at a high price; 6) the method of
financing the transactions; 7) the existence of appraisal rights; 8) and the possibility
of appropriation of the benefits of the merger. Id. at 389-95. With regard to the last
criteria, the court specifically rejected the plaintiffs' claim that in order to be fair the
price offered to the minority should reflect a sharing of the "synergistic effect" of the
merger itself between the majority stockholder and the minority. Id. at 395. See
Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 47, at 318-20 (expressing view that if merger transaction results in a benefit to majority by way of savings or synergistic effects, that
savings should be shared between the entities involved). The chancery court found
that placing a value on the benefits accruing from the transaction was too speculative
an exercise and could only practically be considered in an appraisal hearing which
precluded its consideration. Tanzer, 402 A.2d at 395. The chancery court further
found that the defendants had sustained their burden of proof of entire fairness of the
merger by showing that there was a valid business purpose: approval by a majority
of the minority, and a fair price which included a premium. Id.
70. 407 A.2d 1032 (Del. 1979).
71. Id. The court stated that the "short-cut to merger afforded by § 253 may
not be used to short-circuit the law of fiduciary duty." Id. at 1036 (citing Note,
Allegation that Majority Shareholders Effected a Merger for the Sole Purpose of Freezing Out
Minorty Shareholders States a Cause ofAction for Breach ofFiduciar Duty, 46 GEo. WASH.
L. REV. 877, 892 (1978)). See also Kemp v. Angel, 381 A.2d 241 (Del. Ch. 1977)
(court refused to preliminarily enjoin short-form merger but directed case to go to
trial for inquiry into entire fairness of merger in light of recent case law, implying
applicability of Singer and Tanzer in the short-form merger context).
The facts of Roland were described by the court as a classic example of "going
private." Tanzer, 407 A.2d at 1037. Hyatt Corporation and the individual defendants owned 97.6% of the stock of Roland International Corp. (Roland). Id. at 1033.
The defendants created Landro Corporation (Landro) for the purpose of merging
with Roland. Id. Subsequent to the creation of Landro, the owners of the 97.6%
block of Roland stock contributed their Roland stock to Landro in exchange for a
like number of Landro shares. Id. As a result, the contributors owned all of the
outstanding shares of Landro, with Landro owning 97.6% of Roland. Id. Landro
and Roland shared a common board of directors. Id. The board and shareholders of
Landro then authorized the merger of Landro and Roland in which the minority
shareholders of Roland would receive $5.25 per share. Id. Hence, the minority

shareholders of Roland were cashed out. Id.
The court noted recent commentary suggesting that different standards of review be given depending on the type of merger before the court. Id. at 1034 n.4. See
Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE L.J. 1354, 1359
(1978) (freezeouts require safeguards for minority which take various forms depend-

ing on type of merger but since going private transactions are of small value and high
risk they should be prohibited); Note, Singer v. Magnavox and Cash Take-out Mergers,
64 VA. L. REV. 1101, 1113 (1978) ("any ruling on cash take-out mergers should reflect the various interests and positions of the parties by varying the level of judicial
scrutiny with the factual situation in which the merger arose."). But see Goldman &
Wolfe, In Response to A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 683
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fendants' arguments premised on Staufr that the short-form merger statute
presumed a valid business purpose and that the statutory elimination of
stockholder approval of the merger terms foreclosed their right to object to
the transaction. 7 2 Even though the Roland plaintiffs had requested money
damages as opposed to an injunction or recission, the court held, over a
strong dissent, 7 3 that the rules established in Singer and Tanzer were nonethe74
less applicable to the challenged short-form merger.
(1979) (rejecting the Brudney and Chirelstein classification for determining validity
of purpose of merger as overly conclusive and subject to so many possible exceptions
as to be of limited utility). The court recognized that such an approach would maintain corporate flexibility but stated that the duty owed by the majority stockholder
does not depend upon the type of merger involved. 407 A.2d at 1034 n.4. The court
stated that the "basic concepts underlying the fiduciary duty-that corporate property belongs (in the equitable sense) to all shareholders (not just majority shareholders), and that those in control of the corporate machinery are accountable to all
owners of the corporate property-do not suggest otherwise." Id.
72. 407 A.2d at 1035-36. While the court agreed that the short-form merger
provided a tool for eliminating the minority, it reiterated that the Singer court had
not read Stauffer "as approving a merger accomplished solely to freeze-out the minority without a valid business purpose." Id. at 1036 (quoting Singer, 380 A.2d at 978
(emphasis added)). The court added, however, that in holding the Singer principles
applicable to a short-form merger it followed that "any statement in Staufer inconsistent with that holding is overruled." Id. at 1036.
73. Id. at 1037 (Quillen, J., dissenting). Justice Quillen criticized the majority's
formalization of the broad equitable principles contained in Snger into rules requiring fairness hearings "without express reference to any specific allegations." Id. at
1038 (Quillen, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). While recognizing the "enormity"
of the fiduciary problem, Justice Quillen stated that its recognition should not "trigger a series of mechanics more akin to legislative detail and administration regulation
than equitable review," but rather an inquiry turning on the facts of the case. Id. at
1039 (Quillen, J., dissenting). Noting that the plaintiff had not sought continued
equitable participation in the corporation or injunctive relief, Justice Quillen viewed
the complaint as being directed to an allegedly inadequate price for the minority
shares. Id. Significantly, Justice Quillen concluded his dissent by stating that the
court "should not foster an unnecessary damage forum because of any judicial limitation placed on the statutory appraisal procedures. Rather, [the court] should encourage this legislatively established valuation process to be open to generally
accepted techniques of evaluation used in other areas of business and law." Id. at
1040 n.12 (Quillen, J., dissenting). See also Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 413 A.2d
137, 151 (Del. 1980) (Quillen, J., concurring) (since concept of "entire fairness" arose
in valuation context in Sterling, it should be applied to statutory appraisal proceedings to encourage the flexibility implicit in the traditional standard). For a discussion
of Bell v. Kirby, see Comment, Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp.: Ascertaining "Fair Value"
Under the Delaware Appraisal Statute, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 426 (1981).
74. 407 A.2d at 1037. The public shareholders of Roland were offered cash or,
alternatively, their appraisal rights. Id. at 1033. The plaintiffs chose neither alternative, but instead, brought a class action five months after the merger date on behalf
of all minority stockholders. Id. at 1033-34. Plaintiffs claimed that the majority
shareholders had breached their fiduciary duty to the minority by deciding to "go
private" for the sole purpose of cashing out the minority at an inadequate price. Id.
One commentator has argued that Roland can be read as evidencing the court's recognition of the inadequacy of the appraisal procedure for assessing "entire fairness."
See Weiss, supra note 49, at 672. He points out that the Roland court implicitly criticized evaluation procedures when it stated that the majority could not discharge its
fiduciary duty by relegating the minority to appraisal when "the timing of [the
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Singer and its progeny, while providing an alternative forum for determining the fairness of the terms of a cash-out merger, provided little guidance to the lower courts in the manner of assessing those terms. 75 In Lynch
v. Vickers Energy Corp. ,76 the Delaware Supreme Court addressed the proper
measure of damages in a breach of fiduciary duty action. 77 Lynch did not
involve a merger, but rather, arose out of the first step in a two-step plan to
eliminate the public shareholders of TransOcean Oil Co. 78 Vickers, the majority shareholder of TransOcean, had made a tender offer for all of the
outstanding shares of TransOcean stock, at what the plaintiffs alleged to be a
grossly inadequate price. 79 In its first review of the case, the court held that
merger] is entirely within the control of the majority." Id. (quoting Roland Int'l
Corp. v. Najjar, 407 A.2d at 2034).
75. For a discussion of the Tanzer chancery court's approach to the meaning of
"entire fairness" when applied to a merger, see note 69 supra.
76. 429 A.2d 497 (Del. 1981) ("Lynch 11").
77. Id. at 500.
78. Id. at 504 n.6. Vickers' offering circular disclosed that if it were unable to
acquire all of the outstanding stock of the TransOcean minority by tender offer, it
intended to acquire the remainder by merger. Id. The extent to which the court
equated the Vickers plan to a merger may or may not be revealed by its reference to
the Vickers tender offer as a "merger." Id. at 504 n.6.
79. Id. at 499-500. The many decisions comprising the Lynch case involved the
tender offer by Vickers Energy Corporation (Vickers), a wholly-owned subsidiary of
Esmark, Inc. (Esmark), for all of the outstanding common stock of TransOcean Oil,
Inc. (TransOcean). Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 351 A.2d 570, 571 (Del. Ch.
1976), rev'd, 383 A.2d 278 (Del. 1977) ("Lynch I"), on remand, 402 A.2d 5 (Del. Ch.
1979), afdinpart,rev'dznparl, 429 A.2d at 497 ("Lynch II"). At the time of the tender
offer, Vickers was already a 53.5% majority stockholder of TransOcean. 351 A.2d at
571. TransOcean was engaged directly and through its subsidiaries in the business of
discovering and exploiting sources of natural gas and petroleum. Id. at 572. The
circular accompanying the offer disclosed that the net asset value of TransOcean was
"not less than $200,000,000 (approximately $16.00 per share) and could be substantially greater." Id. at 573-74 (emphasis in original). The offer also disclosed that
Vickers' purpose in acquiring more TransOcean common stock was that it believed
the TransOcean stock was worth more than its current market price reflected, and
therefore, made an attractive long-term investment. Id. at 574. The offer also informed TransOcean shareholders that if a substantial amount of TransOcean stock
were tendered, an inactive market would remain for the nontendered stock. Id. at
572. In addition, the offer disclosed that if fewer than 300 shareholders remained
after the tender offer was completed, the stock would be deregistered as permitted by
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Id.
On October 11, 1974, the plaintiff tendered her 100 TransOcean shares in response to.Vickers' offer of $12 per share. Id. at 571. Even though the holders of 4,460
of the 7,250 minority shares of TransOcean chose not to tender their shares, Vickers
was able to increase its interest in TransOcean from 53.5% to 87%. Id. at 572. The
plaintiff brought a class action on behalf of all shareholders who sold their shares in
response to the Vickers tender offer and sought damages for injuries suffered as a
result of their sales. Id. Plaintiff alleged that Vickers, Esmark and certain directors
of TransOcean who did not actively oppose the offer, had breached their fiduciary
duty to the minority shareholders of TransOcean by failing to make full disclosure
concerning the value of TransOcean's assets and by using their superior bargaining
position and control of the corporation to coerce the minority to sell their shares at a
grossly inadequate price. Id. Specifically, plaintiff claimed that the defendants
should have disclosed to the minority that the TransOcean assets had also been val-
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the majority had breached its fiduciary duty by failing to disclose material
information in its tender-offer circular.8 0 On remand, the chancery court, in
order to measure the damages resulting from the offeror's lack of disclosure, ' applied the appraisal approach to valuation to determine the fair
ued at $250,800,000 by a member of TransOcean's management that Vickers had
authorized open market purchases of the TransOcean stock at any price up to $15,
and that TransOcean's on-shore and North Sea drilling positions were potentially
significant. Id. at 574. The plaintiff claimed damages equal to the difference between the $12 tender-offer price and the fair value of their shares, which plaintiff
contended would be comparable to their value if determined in an appraisal proceeding. Id. at 573.
The chancery court found that since the offering circular emphasized that the
value of TransOcean's assets was "not less than" $200,000,000 and included a statement that they could be worth more, given the uncertainties inherent in the petroleum business and the dubious assumptions contained in the internal TransOcean
valuation, the offering circular furnished the shareholdes with the necessary information. Id. at 574-75. The court also found that there was no need to disclose Vickers'
$15 purchase authorization because the price was in reality a ceiling price on openmarket purchases and the average purchase price had been $11.49, the price that was
disclosed in the circular. d. at 575. The court also concluded that TransOcean's
drilling positions had been fairly represented. Id. The court concluded that since
Vickers had adequately disclosed the relevant facts and circumstances surrounding
the transaction, it had pursued a legitimate course of action. Id.
80. Lynch I, 383 A.2d at 278. The court agreed with the chancellor's conclusion
that since Vickers was the majority shareholder of TransOcean it owed a fiduciary
duty to the plaintiff which required "complete candor." Id. at 279. However, the
court disagreed with the chancery court's application of the principle. Id. It stated
as follows:
The Court's duty was to examine what information defendants had and to
measure it against what they gave to the minority stockholders, in a context
The
T.. limited function of the
in which "complete candor" is required ..
Court was to determine whether defendants had disclosed all information
in their possession germane to the transaction in issue . . . information
such as a reasonable shareholder would consider important in deciding
whether to sell or retain stock.
d. at 281 (citing TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976)).
As the court explained, the objective of requiring "complete candor" is to prevent an insider's use of special knowledge to his advantage and to the detriment of
stockholders. Id. at 281. The court found that the majority had failed to disclose two
critical facts to the minority: 1) the existence of a report made by a member of
TransOcean's management which calculated the minimum net asset value of TransOcean significantly higher than that contained in the offer; and 2) the fact that Vickers had authorized open-market purchases of TransOcean shares just prior to the
tender offer at a price which was three dollars higher than the offering price. Id. at
280.
81. 402 A.2d at 11-13. The chancery court concluded that a proceeding similar
to that of an appraisal proceeding was appropriate where active fraud had not been
proven. Id. at 11 (citing Poole v. N.V. Deli Maatchappij, 43 Del. Ch. 283, 243 A.2d
67 (Del. 1966)). The court rejected the plaintiff's argument premised on Singer and
Tanzer that in a cash-out merger, an appraisal proceeding is not equivalent to a fairness hearing on the terms of the merger. 402 A.2d at 10.
The chancellor assigned a 40% weight to the asset and market values and a 20%
weight to the earnings value of TransOcean, finding that the TransOcean stock had
a fair value of $11.85 per share. Id. at 12. Since the tender-offer price was $12 per
share the chancellor concluded that the tender offer was fair and that the plaintiffs
had not been injured by tendering their shares. Id. at 11-13.
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82
The plaintiffs
value of the minority shares at the time of the tender offer.
appealed the chancery court's determination that they had suffered no damages, and the Delaware Supreme Court reversed, finding that the chancellor
had erroneously relied on the appraisal formula to determine whether relief
should be granted.8 3 The court held that rescissory damages were appropriate in a breach of fiduciary duty context whether or not the plaintiffs had
84
The court did
demonstrated an economic loss as a result of their tender.
not indicate whether a different valuation method should be employed in
measuring the rescissory damages to which the plaintiffs were entitled, nor
did it state whether the measure of damages it set forth was applicable in a
merger context.8 5
It was against this background that the Weinberger court analyzed the
merger between UOP and Signal. The court approved the chancellor's
holding that, in transactions between majority and minority shareholders,
the majority shareholder has the ultimate burden of proving that the transaction is fair.8 6 The concept of fairness was defined by the court in terms of

82. Lynch 1I, 429 A.2d at 500. The court distinguished Poole v N V Deli aatschappij, on the grounds that Poole involved a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation
in a cash-out merger which was a different type of claim than one for breach of
fiduciary duty. 429 A.2d at 500 (citing Poole v. N.V. Deli Maatschappij, 43 Del. Ch.
283, 224 A.2d 260 (Del. 1966)). In addition, the court found that the Poole plaintiffs
had specifically requested that the appraisal formula for measuring damages be applied. Id. at 501. It is suggested that the significance of the Lynch case lies in the

court's statements distinguishing Poole. The court stated that the above-stated differences were important because
the appraisal approach adopted in Poole has a built-in limitation, namely,

gain to the corporation resulting from a statutory merger is not a factor
which is included in determining the value of the shares, and it was not
considered by the Chancellor. But that limitation does not apply when a
fiduciary has breached a duty to those to whom it is owed.
Id.

83. Id. at 501, 504. The Delaware Supreme Court concluded that the damages
were to be measured by the difference between the tender price and the equivalent
value of the stock as of the time of judgment, which was the date the trial for damages ended. Id. at 503, 505.
84. In order to provide some guidance to the trial court, the court stated that

"given the fiduciary relationship, the arms-length bargaining employed in the
purchases should not have resulted in the minority stockholders receiving less than

Vickers was ready to pay strangers for the same stock." Id. at 505. Vickers had
authorized open market purchases of TransOcean at the time of its tender offer at
any price up to $15. 1d. Concerning th method of valuation employed by the chancery court, the court did not proffer a different approach but rather found the assignment of the same weight to asset and market value to be "highly questionable." Id.
85. Id. While justifying its application of rescissory damages in a breach of
fiduciary duty case, the court cited Singer as evidence that Delaware recognized and
enforced the fiduciary duty owed by a majority stockholder. Id. at 503 n.4. See Harmon v. Masonilan Int'l, 442 A.2d 487 (Del. 1982) (citing Lynch for proposition that
rescissory damages are available for breach of fiduciary duty, in a merger context).
For critical commentary of the Lynch decisions, see Fischel, supra note 49, at 929-35.
See also Schlagman, Recent Developments in DelawareCorporatzin Law, 6 DEL. J. CORP. L.
513, 515-16 (1981); Weiss, supra note 49, at 673-75.

86. 457 A.2d at 703. Addressing the burden of proof to be assigned in cases
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two basic aspects-fair dealing and fair price. 87 Because the court found
that the business purpose requirement of Singer, Tanzer, and Roland did not
afford minority shareholders any additional meaningful protection, the court
declined to include the requirement of a valid business purpose in its definition of fairness, stating that "such requirement shall no longer be of any
88
force or effect."
The court found that a primary issue mandating reversal was the preparation of the feasibility study prepared by the Signal-designated UOP directors for the exclusive use of Signal.8 9 The court elaborated upon the "longexisting principle of Delaware law" that the Signal-designated directors of
UOP owed an uncompromising duty of loyalty to UOP and its shareholders.90 The interested directors were required to demonstrate their "utmost
challenging a cash-out merger, the court stated that the plaintiff initially must allege
specific acts of misconduct which would demonstrate the unfairness of the merger
terms to the minority. Id. The ultimate burden of proof rests with the majority
shareholder to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the transaction is fair.
Id. However, if the merger was approved by a majority of minority shareholders, the
ultimate burden of proving unfairness remains on the complaining stockholders. Id.
(citing Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 224 (Del. 1979)). The minority's approval of the merger will place the burden of proof on them only if their vote was
informed. Id. at 703. Thus, the majority must show complete disclosure to the minority to rely on the vote to shift the burden of proof to the challenging minority
stockholder. Id.
87. Id. at 711 (citing Moore, The "Interested" Direct&o or Ofter Transaction, 4 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 674, 676 (1979); Nathan & Shapiro, supra note 69, at 46-47). The court
cautioned that the inquiry, while structured upon two separate concepts, fair price
and fair dealing, should not be bifurcated. Id. However, the court noted that in a
non-fraudulent transaction, fair price might be a preponderant consideration. Id.
88. 457 A.2d at 715. The court concluded that the fairness test of Sterhhg which
applied to parent-subsidiary mergers, the expanded appraisal remedy it had set forth,
and the broad discretion of the Chancellor to fashion appropriate relief, served adequately to protect minority shareholders. Id.
The chancery court had found that Signal had a valid purpose for the merger
since UOP was the best acquisition opportunity it had, and because the merger
would increase earnings, facilitate flow of resources between Signal and its subsidiaries, increase tax, accounting and insurance savings, decrease reporting costs to regulatory agencies, and eliminate potential conflict of interest problems. 426 A.2d at 1349.
The supreme court agreed with commentators who had suggested that the chancery
court's finding has led to the business purpose test being "virtually interpreted out of
" 457 A.2d at 715 (quoting Weiss, supra note 49, at 671 n.300). The
existence ....
court also noted that the business purpose requirement was new to the Delaware law
of mergers, and was a departure from prior case law. 457 A.2d at 715 (citing Stauffer
v. Standard Brands, Inc. 41 Del. Ch. 7, 187 A.2d 78 (Del. 1962); David J. Greene &
Co. v. Schenley, Indus., 281 A.2d 30 (Del. Ch. 1971)). For a discussion of Staufer and
Schenley, see notes 25-33 and accompanying text supra.
89. 457 A.2d at 708.
90. Id. at 710-11 (quoting Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503, 510
(Del. 1939). The court stated that this principle did not vary when applied to persons who act as directors for both a parent and its subsidiary corporation. Id. at 710.
In that context, the same duty of good management would be owed to both corporations and that duty was to be exercised in light of what would be best for both corporations. Id.
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good faith" and the "entire fairness" of the transaction 9 ' because directors
common to both Signal and UOP had stood on both sides of, and had participated in, the transaction, and because there had been no attempt to
structure the transaction on an arm's length basis. 92 The court equated this
duty of loyalty owed by the interested directors with the requirement set
forth in Lynch I which calls for complete disclosure of information that a
"reasonable shareholder would consider important in deciding whether to
93
sell or retain stock."
Applying these principles to the facts of We'nberger, the court concluded
that the preparation of the feasibility study did not meet the requisite fiduciary standards. 94 The study contained information of material significance to
the minority shareholders of UOP since it showed that the range of prices
that would make UOP a "good investment" for Signal could have been
95
worth as much as $17,000,000 to the UOP minority shareholders.
Examining the merger for other indicia of fair dealing, the court found
that Signal had structured its terms unilaterally. 96 Further, neither the feasibility study nor the manner in which Lehman's opinion had been prepared
was disclosed. 97 On these bases, the court concluded that the cash-out
merger between Signal and UOP did not satisfy "any reasonable concept of
98
fair dealing."
91. Id. at 710 (citing Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 177, 178-79,
91 A.2d 57, 57-58 (Del. 1952); Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293,
298, 93 A.2d 107, 110 (Del. 1952); Bastian v. Bourns, Inc., 256 A.2d 680, 681 (Del.
Ch. 1969), af'd, 278 A.2d 467 (Del. 1970); David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int'l,
Inc., 249 A.2d 427, 431 (Del. Ch. 1968)).
92. 457 A.2d at 710. In a footnote, the court stated that "the result here could
have been entirely different if UOP had appointed an independent negotiating committee of its outside directors to deal with Signal at arm's length." Id. at 709 n.7
(citing Harriman v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 411 F. Supp. 133 (D. Del. 1975)
(merger negotiations between Du Pont and Christiana carried out by independent
negotiating committee comprised of persons unconnected with the opposing negotiators, and aided by retention of separate financial advisers for each party to the
merger)). The court continued by stating that
fairness in this context can be equated to conduct by a theoretical, wholly
independent, board of directors acting upon the matter before them, it is
unfortunate that this course was neither considered nor pursued. . . . Particularly in a parent-subsidiary context, a showing that the action taken was
as though each of the contending parties had in fact exerted its bargaining
power against the other at arm's length is strong evidence that the transaction meets the test of fairness.
Id. at 711 n.7 (citing Getty Oil Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 267 A.2d 883, 886 (Del. 1970);
Johnston v. Greene, 35 Del. ch. 479, 490, 121 A.2d 919, 925 (Del. 1956); Puma v.
Marriott, 283 A.2d 693, 696 (Del. Ch. 1971)).
93. Id. at 710 (quotingLynch !, 383 A.2d at 281). For a discussion of Lynch !, see
notes 76-85 and accompanying text supra.
94. 457 A.2d at 708, 711.
95. 457 A.2d at 709.
96. Id. at 711.
97. Id. at 712. For an explanation of the Lehman opinion, see note 9 supra.
98. 457 A.2d at 712. In examining the transaction for elements of fair dealing,
the court also inquired into the evolution of the merger. Id. at 711. The court noted
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Turning to the second aspect of fairness-fair price-the court held that
valuation was to take place pursuant to the procedures outlined in the Delaware appraisal statute. 99 However, the court, in its exegesis of the Delaware
appraisal statute rejected the chancellor's reliance on the "Delaware block
approach" to valuation, stating that "to the extent that [approach] excludes
other generally accepted techniques used in the financial community and
the courts, it is now clearly outmoded."" ° Instead, the court adopted what
it viewed as a more "liberal, less rigid and stylized, approach to the valuation process."''
Drawing from long-standing precedent and an analysis of the appraisal
statute's legislative history, the court stated that fair price required "consideration of all relevant factors involving the value of a company"' 1 2 which
might also include any damages sustained by the stockholders as a class due
to the taking of their shares.' 0 3 The only limit the court placed upon the
"relevant factors" to be considered in valuation under its new approach was
the statutory exclusion of "any element of value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger."' 4 This limitation was construed narrowly by the court as eliminating the use of speculative data.' 0 5
that the entire transaction was initiated by Signal and was accomplished pursuant to
time constraints imposed by Signal. Id. The court stated that the hurried nature of
the transaction was not in itself indicative of a lack of fair dealing. Id. Rather, it was
important to scrutinize what had, or had not, occurred during that time period. Id.
99. Id. at 713. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (Supp. 1982).
100. 457 A.2d at 712-13. The court found it significant that the method which
was used by the plaintiffs to value their shares focused on the same analytical factors
as the feasibility study conducted by the UOP directors to determine the price Signal
should consider offering for UOP. Id. at 713. For an explanation of the plaintiffs'
proferred methods of valuation, see note 15 supra. For an explanation of the Delaware block approach to share valuation, see notes 39 & 40 and accompanying text
supra.

101. 457 A.2d at 704.
102. Id. at 713 (quoting Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 31 Del. Ch. 523, 526,
74 A.2d 71, 72 (Del. 1950)). The T -Continental language quoted by the court maintained that the factors to be considered should include "market value, asset value,
dividends, earning prospects, the nature of the enterprise and any other facts which
• ..could be ascertained as of the date of the merger and which throw any light on
future prospects of the merged corporation." Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 31
Del. Ch. 523, 526, 74 A.2d 71, 72 (Del. 1950).
103. 457 A.2d at 713-14. In reviewing the legislative history of the appraisal
statute, the court traced the focus of appraisal proceedings from the determination of
the "value" of stock to a determination of the "fair value" of stock with a directive to
consider "all relevant factors." Id. (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (Supp.
1982)). From this review, the court discerned a legislative intent to "fully compensate shareholders for whatever their loss may be, subject only to the narrow limitation
that one cannot take speculative effects of the merger into account." 457 A.2d at 714.
The court stated that if damages were not to be accounted for, the requirement to
consider "all relevant factors" would be eroded. Md.at 713.
104. Id. at 714 (quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (Supp. 1982)).
105. Id. at 713. The court interpreted the Delaware appraisal statute as only
eliminating the use of "proforma data and projections of a speculative variety." Id.
Future value, the court stated, was to be considered as long as it was susceptible of
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The supreme court concluded that appraisal should be the appropriate
remedy for a shareholder challenging a cash-out merger, and thus it returned to the principles of Slaufer and Schenley.°6 The court noted, however, that such an approach may not be adequate "where fraud,
misrepresentation, self-dealing, deliberate waste of corporate assets, or gross
and palpable overreaching are involved." 10 7 Under these circumstances, the
08
court stated that equitable and monetary relief might be appropriate.1
Given the court's approach to valuation under the appraisal statute, it overruled Lynch to the extent it had limited the chancellor's discretion to a single
formula for determining monetary damages. 0 9
Since the Weinberger plaintiffs had foregone their rights to seek an appraisal,"1 0 the court granted them a "quasi-appraisal remedy" which would
allow them to test the twenty-one dollar price obtained for their shares in
conformity with the principles of appraisal it had outlined."I '
In analyzing the Weinberger decision, it is submitted that although the
court has generally added some consistency to the law surrounding cash-out
mergers, the decision has not left the area entirely free from ambiguity.
First, in overruling the valid business purpose requirement of Singer, the
court has eliminated a previously unpredictable standard for determining
the propriety of a cash-out merger." 2 The business purpose test, introduced
proof. Id. Given this approach to valuation, the court stated that the plaintiffs' evidence of the value of their stock, which was based on a discounted cash-flow analysis,
should have been considered by the chancellor. Id. at 714.
106. Id. at 714-15. For a discussion of Stauffer and Schenley, see notes 25-33 and
accompanying text supra.
107. 457 A.2d at 714 (citing Cole v. National Cash Credit Ass'n, 18 Del. Ch. 47,
56, 156 A. 183, 187 (Del. Ch. 1931)). For a discussion of the principles espoused in
Cole, see note 26 supra.
108. 457 A.2d at 714.
109. Id. In the court's view, the approach to valuation it had set forth included
the elements of rescissory damages. Id. For a discussion of the Lynch measure of
damages in a breach of fiduciary duty case, see notes 82-85 and accompanying text
supra.

110. 457 A.2d at 714 n.8. The court noted that the appraisal statute required
that a stockholder perfect his rights to appraisal and then file a petition for appraisal
within 120 days after the effective date of the merger. Id. (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 262 (d) & (e) (Supp. 1982)). For a discussion of the manner of perfecting appraisal rights, see note 36 supra.
111. 457 A.2d at 714. The court stated that the remedy it was granting to the
plaintiff was co-extensive with the valuation and appraisal methods it had approved
for later cases. Id. at 704. The court recognized that other litigants may have given
up their appraisal rights and stated that the remedy fashioned in Weinberger would be
applicable to 1) any case pending on appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court as of the
date of its opinion; 2) any case pending in the court of chancery eligible for direct
appeal to the supreme court at the time of the opinion; 3) any case challenging a
cash-out merger effective on or before February 1, 1983; and 4) any proposed merger
to be presented to stockholders who received notification thereof on or before February 23, 1983. Id. at 714-15.
112. For a discussion of the business purpose rule, see notes 62 & 68-69 and
accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the application of the rule by the lower
courts, see note 69 supra.
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in Singer as a form of minority shareholder protection, was interpreted by the
Tanzer court as being dependent on whether the majority would obtain a
bonafde benefit from the merger.' 13 The bonafides of asserted business purposes, however, were interpreted in such an inconsistent manner as to make
the test wholly vacuous since it is difficult to conceive of a merger where
those in control would cause its consummation if it benefitted neither the
constituent corporations nor their controlling shareholders. 114
The Weinberger court's approach to valuation in the context of appraisal
rights is a clear break from precedent.' 1 5 While the court relied on previous
case law and the legislative history of the appraisal statute to substantiate its
new approach to valuation, 1 6 it is submitted that such reliance may not
have been justified. The case law used by the court is the same precedent
that has been historically cited for mandating that the value of a dissenting
shareholder's shares be measured by the value of his proportionate interest in
a corporation prior to its merger.'' 7 Nevertheless, the Weinberger court has
used that same law to indicate that an appraisal is to determine the value of
a shareholder's proportionate interest in a corporation measured by its value
to an acquiror. 118 This perspective on valuation would serve to equate the
Singer standard for a fair price, as interpreted by the chancery court in
Tanzer,"19 and implied in Lynch, 20° with the determination of fair value
113. For a discussion of the Tanzer interpretation of the business purpose test
and its subsequent application, see notes 65-69 and accompanying text supra.
114. For an illustration of the varying effects of the application of the business
purpose test, see note 69 supra.
115. For a discussion of the method customarily employed to value shares prior
to Weinberger, see notes 37-40 and accompanying text supra.
116. See 457 A.2d at 713-14; notes 102-104 and accompanying text supra.

117. The Weinberger court quoted extensively from Tri-Continental Corp. v.
Battye, 31 Del. ch. 523, 74 A.2d 71 (Del. 1950). For an illustration of the Delaware
court's prior use of this case, see note 38 supra.
118. 457 A.2d at 712-13. The court stated that what is to be determined is the
value of the "company" and it emphasized that a company's "future prospects" must
be considered. Id. at 713 (quoting Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 31 Del. Ch. 523,
526, 74 A.2d 71, 72 (Del. 1950)). The court also stated that rescissory damages would
be subsumed within its approach to valuation. Id. at 714. Since rescissory damages
measure the value of any gain to an acquirer from an acquisition, it seems clear that
the court is directing that value be measured in terms of the value of the shares to the
acquiring corporation. In addition, the court noted that the chancery court had
rejected the plaintiffs' evidence on the ground that it did not correspond with "either
logic or the existing law." Id. at 712 (quoting 426 A.2d at 1360). Specifically, the
chancery court had determined that equating a fair price with that which a controlling shareholder would be willing to pay for 100% ownership would result in a dual
standard where the value of a plaintiff's stock for purposes of a fairness hearing would
not be equivalent to the value of a plaintiff's stock for the purposes of an appraisal.
426 A.2d at 1359-60. However, the supreme court sanctioned this approach by di-

recting that the chancery court consider the plaintiff's evidence on remand and by
indicating the significance of the fact that the feasibility report had determined its
fair price range on the same basis. 457 A.2d at 712-14.
119. For a discussion of Tanzer, see notes 65-69 and accompanying text supra.

120. For a discussion of Lynch, see notes 76-85 and accompanying text supra.
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under the appraisal statute. 12 1 This reconciliation lends consistency to the
law by eliminating the possibility that cashed-out shareholders will receive a
a
different "fair price" for their shares depending on whether they assert
22
Sznger-type cause of action or whether they seek an appraisal remedy.'
It is submitted that this approach is also consistent with the Delaware
Supreme Court's emphasis on fair dealing. 123 Presumably, in negotiating a
price on behalf of minority stockholders, an independent negotiating team
would seek a price based on what it believed the acquiring majority share124
Thus,
holder would be willing to pay in order to obtain 100% ownership.
any price arrived at by negotiation would generally be greater than the
value of a shareholder's proportionate interest in a "going concern" mea25
sured without regard to the transaction.'
121. On remand in Tanzer, the chancery court determined that the plaintiffs
had received a fair price considering that they had been paid a premium over the
appraised value of their shares. 402 A.2d at 395. For a discussion of the chancery
court decision on remand in Tanzer, see note 69 supra. At least one commentator has
observed that Lynch suggested that Singer may have stood for the proposition that an
entirely fair price is one which provides for the sharing of gains accruing to the majority from merger with the minority. Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L. J. 698, 724 (1982). But see Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., 379
A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977) (in denying plaintiffs' request for reargument, the court rejected the argument that plaintiffs should have been entitled to share in gains accruFor a
ing to the majority from the cash-out of minority shareholder-plaintiffs).
discussion of the standard for valuation under the appraisal remedy as fashioned by
the Weinberger court, see notes 99-105 & 118 and accompanying text supra.
122. If a plaintiff were able to assert a Singer cause of action, he would be entitled to appropriate equitable relief. Such relief would include rescissory damages, the
amount of which would exceed the available "damages" in an appraisal proceeding,
since an appraisal would not include in its valuation formula any gains from the
merger. Compare the discussion of Roland at notes 71-74 and accompanying text supra,
and the discussion of the appropriate measure of damages in Lynch, at note 83 and
accompanying text supra, with Justice Quillen's dissent in Roland, discussed at note 73
supra, and the method of valuation commonly employed in appraisal proceedings
which is discussed at notes 37-40 supra. See also Comment, supra note 69, at 434-37.
123. For a discussion of the court's emphasis on the role an independent negotiating structure would play in ensuring fair dealing, see note 92 supra.
124. See Chazen, FairnessFrom a FinancialPoint of View in Acquisition of Public Companies: Is "Third Party Sale Value" the Appropriate Standard., 36 Bus. LAW. 1439 (1981).
125. However, not consistent with this intention the court directed that on remand the chancellor should consider the plaintiffs' evidence. 457 A.2d at 714. If
that evidence included premiums paid for 100% ownership by non-affiliated third
parties, the court would be equating third party sale value with fair value. It is
suggested that under this standard a controlling corporation would be required to
pay an additional amount for the control which it already owned. See Chazen, supra
note 124 (distinguishing acquisitions of minority interests by unaffiliated third-party
purchasers from similar acquisition by controlling shareholders on the following
grounds: 1) a buyer of an entire company purchases a mixture of control and noncontrol shares while a controlling shareholder only purchases non-control shares;
2) ownership of a company may be worth more to unaffiliated purchasers; and 3) sale
to unaffiliated purchasers may be at a competitive, as opposed to arm's length, price).
It is submitted, as Chazen suggests, that a third party standard of valuation would
compensate minority shareholders for more than their investment expectations. See
id. at 1468 (suggesting that minority shareholders would not expect to receive as
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A source of ambiguity in the Weinberger opinion is evidenced by the
court's suggestion that valuation procedures might account for any damages
suffered by the entire class of minority shareholders as a result of their having been cashed-out. 126 It is submitted that reliance upon precedent which
directs consideration of "all relevant factors" and the statutory mandate to
determine "fair" value is not helpful in deciphering the meaning of the
"damages" that are to be considered. ' 2 7 Several interpretations are possible.
On one hand, the damages sustained by a class of cashed-out minority stockholders could require consideration of reinvestment costs, unanticipated income tax assessments, or other costs associated with the transformation of an
investment into cash. 128 On the other hand, the court could be directing
that the determination of "fair" value be accomplished by examining the
damages sustained as a result of a controlling shareholder's breach of fiducilarge a premium for their shares as would be anticipated by holders of control
shares). See also Schenley, 281 A.2d at 33 (value of minority shareholder's stock should
be determined by considering, inter a/ta, the effect of the existence of a controlling
shareholder).
Thus, by failing to define clearly what is to be measured in an appraisal by the
newly available techniques, the Weinberger court has not foreclosed one of the major
controversies surrounding cash-out mergers-that is, by what standard is fair value to
be judged? Compare Chazen, supra note 124 (controlling shareholder should be required to prove fairness of price by demonstrating that the price paid to acquire
minority interest was equivalent to, or product of, negotiated acquisition on arm's
length basis as opposed to third-party sale value) with Weiss, supra note 49, at 678-79
(measure of fairness in take-out mergers should be the value of minority shares as a
proportion of corporation as a whole, not their public trading price, but failing to
distinguish between third-party sale value and parent-subsidiary arm's length negotiation price).
126. See note 103 and accompanying text supra.
127. Id.
128. For a discussion of the external costs to dissenting shareholders resulting
from cash-outs, and Delaware courts' unwillingness to account for these costs in appraisal proceedings or fairness hearings, see Brudney, supra note 50 (even if appraisal
does ensure fair value of stock it does not treat dissenting stockholder equally with
those who retained control after merger since appraisal does not compensate for reinvestment costs, tax disadvantages, or delay); Elfin, supra note 20 (fair price to minority shareholders requires that an equivalent price be paid to the majority, therefore,
the minority should receive a premium over pre-merger value plus consideration for
tax disadvantages and brokerage fees resulting from being cashed-out to ensure that
net funds received by the minority place them in an equivalent position with majority shareholders); Manning, supra note 34, at 233 (tax laws tend to dissuade shareholders from making use of appraisal mechanism); Toms, Compensating Shareholders
Frozen Out in Two-Step Mergers, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 548 (1978) (criticizing Brudney
and Chirelstein proposal for compensation of minority shareholders, and proposing
that fair compensation be determined by evaluating the intrinsic value of merging
corporation plus a pro rata share of benefits accruing to the merged corporation and
compensation for institutional costs such as taxes (which may require a reinterpretation or revision of the Internal Revenue Code) and reinvestment costs (which may
require revisions of state appraisal statutes)). It is recognized that given the uniqueness to each shareholder of the external costs of being cashed-out, such costs would be
difficult to determine on a class-wide basis.
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ary duty.' 29 This latter interpretation is supported by the court's emphasis
on the legislative change in the appraisal statute requiring determination of
"fair value" rather than "value."' 30 It is also supported by the fact that the
Weinberger plaintiffs were relegated to a quasi-appraisal proceeding themselves, in a case where a breach of fiduciary duty had been found. 3
It is
submitted that additional support for this construction can be found in the
court's suggestion that rescissory damages might be available to the plaintiffs
even though the remedy it afforded them was co-extensive with an appraisal.' 32 While this construction may be supportable by the language of
the Weiberger opinion, it is submitted that such an interpretation would
mean that the court had effectively overruled prior case law consistently
holding that the only issue before the court in an appraisal proceeding is
33
valuation.
This latter construction evinces the need for an examination of the exclusivity of the appraisal remedy as fashioned by the court. Weinberger has
mandated that a plaintiff's monetary remedy is ordinarily to be confined to
an appraisal.134 However, if a plaintiff can demonstrate fraud, misrepresentation, self-dealing, deliberate waste, or gross overreaching, the chancellor is
free to fashion other forms of relief.' 35 While the court may have intended
to set forth the available remedies in unambiguous terms, the result of the
Weiberger case itself casts considerable doubt on when different forms of
relief might be available. The Weinberger plaintiffs had demonstrated a lack
of disclosure amounting to a breach of fiduciary duty, thus demonstrating
the failure of the defendants to satisfy the fair dealing aspect of "entire fairness," yet were relegated to a remedy co-extensive with appraisal.' 36 If the
court has determined that damages resulting from a breach of fiduciary duty
may be addressed in an appraisal proceeding, then it might be argued that
whenever a majority shareholder's lack of fair dealing affects only the price
offered to the minority for their shares, an appraisal should be their exclusive
remedy. However, it should be noted in discussing the scope of the appraisal
remedy, it was the plaintiffs' monetary remedies which the court restricted to
appraisal. 37 If the fairness of the price being offered to minority sharehold129. It is suggested that any damages resulting from a breach of fiduciary duty
are clearly determinable on a class-wide basis.
130. See note 103 supra; Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 413 A.2d 137, 150 (Quillen, J., concurring) (suggesting that since the standard of "entire fairness" arose in a
valuation context, the doctrine is applicable in a statutory appraisal proceeding).
131. See notes l10 & 111 and accompanying text supra.
132. See notes 109-111 & 118 and accompanying text supra.
133. See note 36supra.
134. See note 106 and accompanying text supra.
135. The court noted that while the issue of entire fairness should not be the
subject of a bifurcated inquiry into fair price and fair dealing, it recognized that "in a
non-fraudulent transaction . . . , the price may be the preponderant consideration

outweighing other features of the merger." 457 A.2d at 711. Set notes 107-109 and
accompanying text supra.
136. See notes 110 & Ill and accompanying text supra.
137. 457 A.2d at 714. The court stated that "[wihile a plaintiff's monetary rem-

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1983

31

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 5 [1983], Art. 7
1080

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28: p. 1049

ers is all that is being challenged, under the Stau er and Schenley rationale, as
affirmed by Weinberger, an appraisal would appear to be a plaintiff's exclusive remedy.' 38 This may be true even where plaintiffs allege constructive
fraud, because the only grounds for disagreement in such a case stems from
an allegedly unfair price. However, where plaintiffs seek injunctive relief on
the basis of alleged unfair dealing, the availability of that relief would seem
to depend, not only on whether the unfairness is equivalent to fraud, but also
on whether any resultant injury could not be compensated for, or remedied

by an appraisal proceeding.' 39 It is submitted that just as the Delaware
Supreme Court left the business purpose test open for later interpretation, so
has it left the question of appropriate forms of relief subject to subsequent
interpretation. ,40
Given the questions left unanswered by the Weinberger court, the major
impact of the decision will be felt in its implementation by the lower courts.
Of major significance to both prospective plaintiffs and the plaintiffs' bar
will be lower courts' interpretation of the availability of injunctive relief
4
against a cash-out merger.1 '
Considering the impact of the Weinberger approach to valuation, it is
submitted that the latitude afforded lower courts in utilizing the available
appraisal techniques could well serve the supreme court's policy of ensuring
that cash-out mergers are entirely fair and that minority shareholders are
edy should ordinarily be confined to the more liberalized appraisal proceeding herein
established, we do not intend any limitation on the historic powers of the Chancellor
to grant such other relief as the facts of a particular case may dictate." Id. The
Weinberger plaintiffs had sought rescission and the court's relegation of them to an
appraisal proceeding was couched in its finding that the merger was too involved to
undo." Id.
138. For a discussion of Staufer and Schenley, see notes 25-33 supra.
139. An example of such circumstances might be where a lack of fair dealing by
a controlling shareholder misled minority shareholders into failing to perfect their
appraisal rights.
140. It is suggested that the court's citation to the Cole case as support for its
finding that equitable relief may be warranted in certain cases, may provide a means
for litigants and lower courts to avoid the appraisal remedy more often then the
Weinberger court may have intended. See 457 A.2d at 714 (citing Cole v. National
Cash Credit Ass'n, 18 Del. Ch. 17, 56 A.2d 183 (Del. Ch. 1931). In Cole, the chancellor held that the election of appraisal rights might not be required when, among
other instances, the terms of the merger arose from a breach of trust. Id. For a
discussion of the Cole line of cases, see note 26 supra. For a discussion of the business
purpose test and its subsequent interpretation by the Delaware Supreme Court, see
notes 62-69 & 113-114 and accompanying text supra.
141. The procedural strictures of the appraisal remedy which limit those entitled to seek an appraisal to shareholders who have "perfected" their appraisal rights,
and which fail to compensate adequately a shareholder for the transaction costs of an
appraisal, serve to reduce the number of shareholders that seek an appraisal and,
consequently, the amount of any recovery from which attorneys' fees may be obtained. The probable reduction in available attorneys' fees, when compared to the
more lucrative fees available in class actions, may be a disincentive to attorneys to
represent shareholders in appraisal proceedings.
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42
afforded the opportunity to demonstrate the true value of their shares.1
Alternatively, the lack of guidance provided by the Weinberger decision could
have an inhibiting effect on the progressive approach to valuation it has
espoused. 143

The lower court's implementation of the appraisal statute will, in turn,
have a major impact upon the disclosure practices of Delaware corporations.
If the purpose of disclosure in this context is to enable a shareholder to make
an informed determination of whether or not to accept the terms of a cashout merger or file a petition for appraisal, then any valuation analyses that
might be deemed an appropriate method of valuation in an appraisal proceeding would materially bear upon that shareholder's decision and thus,
should be disclosed. 144 Until the parameters of the Webnberger approach to
valuation are determined, the parameters of the disclosure requirement will
remain unknown.
Finally, the court's emphasis on the importance of an independent negotiating structure will clearly impact upon the methods used to consummate a cash-out merger.' 45 The court stated that if the interested directors
had abstained from participation in the merger, or if an independent negotiating committee had been appointed, the conflicts inherent in the SignalUOP merger might have been resolved. This observation may well serve to
142. Given the availability of a wide range of possible valuation techniques,
plaintiffs in ari appraisal proceeding will no longer be compelled to utilize the "Delaware block approach" which has been criticized for its consistent undervaluation of
shareholder interests. However, it is submitted that notwithstanding the court's "liberalized" approach to appraisal, its suggestion that an appraisal serve as a stockholder's "basic recourse" may not ensure the "entire fairness" of cash-out mergers in
itself. Given the procedural restrictions of perfecting the appraisal remedy, an appraisal would not seem to ensure fairness if it is determined that all minority stockholders received an inadequate price for their shares, yet compensation is available
only for those shareholders who complied with the statutory prerequisites. Certainly,
the procedural and practical difficulties in utilizing the appraisal remedy have not
been reduced by Wetmberger.
143. The Wetberger court stated that evidence of value that was of a speculative
variety was a narrow exception to the appraisal statute's mandate that "all relevant
factors" be considered in determining fair value. 457 A.2d at 713. It is noted that
this is precisely the reason that the chancery court rejected the plaintiffs' evidence of
value based on the discounted cash-flow analysis. 426 A.2d at 1359. The chancery
court found that the opportunity for the subjective selection of a discount factor
which could dramatically alter the outcome, "rendered [the plaintiff's] discounted
cash flow approach unnerving." Id. In addition, the Weinberger court's rejection of
the "Delaware block approach" to valuation may be interpreted narrowly by lower
courts faced with valuation procedures which are speculative and/or difficult to implement with certainty. A narrow interpretation might be justified on the basis of
the court's statement that the approach "shall no longer exclusively control [appraisal] proceedings." 457 A.2d at 713.
144. As stated by the court in Lynch and repeated in Weinberger, controlling
shareholders who stand on both sides of a merger transaction are required to disclose
"all information germane to the transaction in issue." Id. at 710 (quoting Lynch I,
383 A.2d at 281.
145. See note 92 and accompanying text supra.
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undercut the impact of Weinberger on controlling shareholders. ' 46 If a parent
corporation utilizes these devices when merging with a subsidiary, the court
has indicated that close judicial scrutiny would not be necessary and that the
strict disclosure requirements imposed by Weinberger might not be applicable.147 If the Weinberger criteria are not applicable, the Delaware Supreme
Court may have to shift its focus from "entire fairness" to "entire independence."
Ellen V Kittredge
146. Id.
147. Id. But see Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981) (conclusion of independent committee of directors to dismiss derivative action subject to two
prong judicial scrutiny into independence and good faith of committee as well as the
merits of the decision made by the independent committee). See also Brudney, The
Independent Director-Heavenly Ciy or Potemkin Village?, 95 HARV. L. REV. 597 (1982).
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